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1952

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EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E E1824/41

FROM

Daily Telegraph.

No.

Dated

Received in Registry— 29.8.52. 30.8.52

Article by Lt. Gen. Sir Alex. Galloway.

"What can be done about the Arab Refugees"

153

Last Paper.

References.

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(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Copy) Sir H. Knight. Beirut 9 Sept.

Copy) UK Del, N. York. Amman 16 Sept

(Action completed.) 18/9

(Index.) 16/10

Next Paper.

(Minutes.)

This is a good article, & should, I suggest, be copied to Sir H. Knight & to UK Del, New York.

Sir A. Galloway's conclusion is that the Western Powers should take an active hand in the negotiations with the Arab Governments, instead of leaving them to UNRWA. It seems to me, however, that the organisation which is really doing the job is in the best position to negotiate - backed up, as it is, by our diplomatic support. What might be worth considering is whether the Advisory Commission should not play a much more active part in the negotiations - as was originally intended. At present the Director conducts the negotiations single-handed, merely keeping the Advisory Commission informed. We heard recently that the Jordan Govt. had expressed a desire to hold meetings with the whole Advisory Commission.

C Waterlow 4/9

I agree that

26513 F.O.P.

I agree that it would be valuable if the Advisory Commission took a more active part in negotiations with the Governments of Syria & Jordan and we might encourage Sir H. Knight to push for this.

Copy as suggested
and to Amman Chancery

AWR
4/9

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN ON THIS PAGE.

DAILY TELEGRAPH
Cutting dated ..... 29 AUG 1952 ....., 195

E 1824/44

WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT THE ARAB REFUGEES?

By Lt.-Gen. Sir ALEXANDER GALLOWAY

Gen. Galloway, a former C.-in-C. and High Commissioner in Austria, recently spent a year as representative in Jordan on the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Arab refugees.

IT is now some four years since the United Nations assumed responsibility for more than 800,000 Arab refugees who fled their homes as a result of the Palestine war. Much money (including British contributions) has been spent; a very large organisation has been built up by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency; yet this major problem of the Middle East appears to be as far as ever from solution.

After the exodus from Palestine, refugees remained in neighbouring countries in the following approximate numbers:

Jordan	470,000
Gaza (Egypt)	200,000
Lebanon	100,000
Syria	80,000
Israel	23,000

These figures are interesting in relation to the possibilities of resettlement.

Development of Jordan

THE Arab Governments dislike UNRWA and mistrust it. They know, of course, that without the relief programme there would soon be chaos among the refugees. There is some criticism of relief, which is understandable, and much criticism of the slow pace of resettlement.

The Jordanian population fear the settlement of large numbers of refugees in their country. But they are aware that it means the spending of large sums of money in Jordan. They want the cash. They want to spend it on schemes for the development of Jordan. If the refugees benefit from this arrangement, so much the better.

The Jordan Government know that, whereas to other Arab countries the refugee problem is a nuisance and its non-settlement a mild source of irritation, for Jordan to be left with several hundred thousand homeless and workless people would be calamitous. They want the United Nations—whom they consider to be originally responsible for the refugee problem—to continue to carry the burden of relief, while the process of developing Jordan moves forward as may be.

Syria has Room

IN Syria the Government is a dictatorship by which a number of much-needed and healthy measures are being inaugurated.

There is plenty of room for development. Half a million refugee families could settle on agricultural schemes with benefit to themselves and to the country. In Syria, as elsewhere, the problem appears to be to acquire the maximum funds with the minimum acceptance of responsibility for settlement.

Like other Arab countries, Syria may not be anxious to take the first step in a programme which indicates acceptance of the fact that the refugees will not return to Palestine. In Syria the activities of the Agency are controlled to a high degree by Government. Local Agency employees are dismissed at will. Internationals are scrutinised and followed about by Security Police. The prestige of United Nations does not stand high.

This is scarcely an ideal atmosphere in which to tackle the problem of refugee settlement in a field where the prospects should be the brightest and best of all. Nor would Syria be much embarrassed if UNRWA departed and left the problem unsolved. Nevertheless she is interested in refugee settlement at her own price and after her own fashion—first of all in small numbers as an experiment.

Irak has embarked upon large schemes of development to be financed out of oil royalties. The country undoubtedly has great possibilities in the future, but Palestine is far away. Irak is unlikely to set the fashion of accepting refugees in large numbers for settlement.

Egypt has troubles of her own. An ill-conceived and expensive attempt to settle refugees in Sinai fell through for lack of water. The refugees in Gaza must go elsewhere. They cannot settle in Egypt.

Finally, the Lebanon, too, has her own problems. She is highly concerned about the religious balance of population, and she has little room for refugees.

Communist Poison

WHAT of the refugees? About 35 per cent. live in camps. The remainder exist as best they can in towns, villages and caves. Some are working. For the most part they sit about, absorbing the relief provided. It is little comfort for them that they serve the Governments as a political stick with which to beat the United Nations.

Such conditions provide an ideal setting for Communist agitators, and within the last year the usual poisonous approach has been on the increase. Meanwhile the refugees breed. It is estimated that settlement at the rate of 12,000 a year would but keep pace with the increase in population.

Nor must we forget a number of people who in Palestine enjoyed wealth and position—business and professional men and landowners. All their worldly possessions are frozen in Israel.

They eke out a miserable existence in the large towns, living in one room. They are not seen by visitors who come to the Middle East to study conditions in camps. Settlement of their claims would improve the whole problem.

UNRWA's Function

AND so to UNRWA: the organisation charged with the relief and resettlement of the refugees. UNRWA took over in 1950 from the emergency organisations, which had done a fine job. By 1951 it became clear that relief alone was useless and that serious efforts must also be made to provide new work and homes for the refugees.

So on July 1, 1951, UNRWA was reorganised to include resettlement as a function. It is directed by Mr. John B. Blandford, Jr., an American. It has an Advisory Commission whose members are provided by the Foreign Offices of Great Britain, France, Turkey and the United States.

UNRWA H.Q. and the Advisory Commission occupy very large offices in Beirut. The Director believes in centralisation, and deals direct with 22 immediate subordinate officials apart from frequent visits to Arab Governments and meetings with the Advisory Commission.

Sense of Frustration

IN each "host" country UNRWA has a set-up. Occasionally the United Nations country representatives are summoned to Beirut for discussions. During the past year I attended several discussions. They achieved little. Decisions were seldom taken, except to postpone decision, although much was often said about unity of effort, sense of high purpose, avoidance of the "Colonial approach."

In Beirut, and elsewhere to a lesser degree, some useless work goes on. Staff beget more staff. Plan follows plan. The typewriters click. Brochures and statistics pour out. The refugees remain and eat, and complain and breed; while a game of political "last touch" goes on between the local Governments and the Director, UNRWA.

Meanwhile the relief programme continues in the Country Districts, operated by local and international members many of whom are devoted to their work and deserve high praise, which they seldom get. If "nothing succeeds like success" the reverse is also true. UNRWA suffers from a feeling of despondency and frustration.

For anyone who has had previous knowledge of the working of United Nations Agencies this is a most unhappy experience. Some ex-members of other agencies are full of praise for their former organisations and highly contemptuous of what happens in UNRWA. It is not surprising that the Arab Governments are sceptical about the good intentions of the United Nations.

Facing Hard Facts

WHAT is the solution? Of course the problem is difficult. Refugee settlement, except under dictatorship, is a long, expensive business. Somehow or other the Arab Governments, the United Nations, UNRWA and some of the refugees have got to face facts.

There is need of a change of heart and a better atmosphere. There is need to distinguish between a tempting political manœuvre and the hard, unpalatable fact that the refugees cannot in the foreseeable future return to their homes in Palestine. To get acceptance of this fact is a matter of politics: it is beyond the function of UNRWA.

Second, a determined effort should be made to get the "host" countries to take over relief from the Agency, thus freeing it to get on with the much more important task of resettlement.

A Fairer Distribution

THIRDLY, the Arab Governments, who know perfectly well the possibilities of resettlement, should be invited to show their willingness to co-operate by agreeing, now, to an immediate redistribution of the refugees to those areas where they can build, with United Nations assistance, a new life.

This would have the great advantage of breaking up the present deplorable camps. It would help to create a new spirit of hope that something useful is at last going to happen. It would help to redress the present unfair balance of refugee population in the host countries, and last, but not least, it would inject a fresh spirit of endeavour all round.

It must be kept quite clear in all discussion that the refugee retains his absolute political right to return to his former home whenever he can. Without this condition being implicit in any arrangement there can be no progress.

Fourthly, a genuine effort should be made to effect a settlement of Arab claims upon the property the refugees left behind in Israel. This most important matter drifts on and tends to be conveniently lost sight of. Its solution would at once improve the whole atmosphere.

Confidence Lacking

ALL this means that the whole problem, which is not only highly political, but also in urgent need of settlement, requires to be dealt with on a higher level than within the Agency. Practically all that the Agency can do is to dangle a dollar carrot in front of the local governments and hope that they will bite. That process can go on interminably. It is of no help to the refugees and wastes money.

The matter can properly be dealt with by the Governments interested in getting a settlement of Middle East affairs. Given evidence of good faith, the job is not impossible. At the present moment faith is completely lacking. The Arabs lack faith in United Nations; United Nations lack confidence in the Arab Governments' willingness to play their part; and UNRWA lacks faith in itself.

RECEIVED IN C.B
30 AUG 1952
SENT TO DEPT.

The leading four kept in close company for most of the first two rounds, but Stimulus lost her third place to Rampant at the beginning of the second beat.

FOUR LEADERS DIVIDE

At the weather mark the four leaders divided into pairs, with Daphne and Cascade fighting closely, ahead of Rampant and Stimulus, also doing battle together. On the last one and a half rounds, however, Daphne drew away from Cascade and Rampant left Stimulus.

Daphne crossed the line just over one minute ahead of Cascade which was well ahead of Rampant. Then came Stimulus and Barry Perry's Chiquita.

The result gives Daphne a lead on points, for she had already had two seconds. Cascade is second with a first, a second and a third. Unless John Oakley wins to-morrow the Jardines will gain the point cup, though a second for Cascade would produce a tie. Results :

Daphne (A. S. Jardine), 2-28-14, 1; **Cascade** (J. Oakley), 2-29-16, 2; **Rampant** (G. Bull), 2-33-17, 3; **Stimulus** (I. Proctor), 2-34-9, 4; **Chiquita** (B. Perry), 2-34-42, 5; **Trio** (R. Vine), 2-35-18, 6; **Wanton** (M. Goffe), 2-35-19, 7; **Invasion** (G. Keene), 2-35-35, 8.

Dragons at Deauville

LE HAVRE, Thursday. — British Dragon yachts made an indifferent start in the first day's racing of the Virginie Heriot Cup regatta here yesterday.

In the opening event, won by the French Baliverne (J. Clamageran), two British entrants, Polaris (H. R. Freemantle, E. Ellsworth-Jones) and Ganymede (J. Raymond, M. Berry), were 4th and 13th respectively.

Candide (J. Peytel) won the second race, the British Inge (J. M. F. Crean, J. Ewing), Polaris and Ganymede being 5th, 7th and 17th. Baliverne also won the third race, Polaris being 7th and Inge 8th.—Reuter.

Solent Regatta

The Royal Solent Y.C. Regatta opened in ideal conditions at Yarmouth, Isle of Wight, yesterday. In the morning the light westerly breeze favoured the smaller craft, the wind freshening slightly in the afternoon. Results :

20ft Rating & Over: Josephine II (C. Smallpeice), 1. **Under 20ft**: Cyra (J. Saunders), 1. **5.5 Metres**: Quail (Maj. Digby Peel), 1. **Dragons**: Sabre (Lt.-Col. T. V. Somers), 1.

maybe Ufton, they may hold their own again. It looks like a draw.

INTENSE RIVALRY

Lancashire's star attraction is the **All-Manchester duel** between City and United at Maine-road. United have never been beaten there by City since the war, and with local rivalry so intense a division of the points could follow what is usually a defensive battle. On their form against Arsenal on Wednesday, however, United should just win.

Middlesbrough, who have won both their matches without conceding a goal, should still be among the 100 per centers after their home match with **Preston**, who have not been successful at Ayresome Park for many seasons. History also points to a home victory for **Liverpool** over **Stoke**. Eight of the last 12 games between the clubs have gone Liverpool's way and the other four were drawn.

Aston Villa moved Gibson to inside-right in place of A. Moss, H. Smith being on the wing. They have reasonable hopes of saving a point at **Derby**, and I fancy **Blackpool** at home will beat **Bolton**, who will be without Langton, Hassall playing on the wing. **Cardiff** and **Sheffield Wednesday**, the promoted clubs, clash at Cardiff. Both are awaiting their first win, and ground advantage may decide in favour of the Welsh team. Cardiff are trying to persuade Rowland, their former centre-forward, to return to them from Stockton.

MAXIMUM-POINTS TEAMS

In the Second Division the maximum four points are held by Hull City, Sheffield United, Plymouth and Leicester. The best prospects of retaining the distinction are held by **Hull** and **Sheffield United**, who are at home to **Brentford** and **Huddersfield** respectively.

Leicester, however, should hold their own at **Southampton**, who lost at home on Wednesday to **Plymouth**. The latter face another stiff hurdle at **Leeds** and may be beaten. **Fulham's** heavy defeat on Monday at Leicester suggests they will lose at **Birmingham**, as the Midland club has picked up three points from their two away fixtures.

HAMLET TRY TWO 17-YEAR-OLDS

to the 18th.

But here, Brook missed a yard putt for the match. On they went and at the 22nd each lost a ball from the tee and a half in 6 followed. At the 24th Turnbull failed with a yard putt for a half and the longest match of the Championship was over.

J. W. Shipperbottam defeated the older of the Large family and Ewart had to work hard to put out B. Stockdale, of Rossall. Ellis, playing most impressively, crushed T. Shingler and then Palmer, who hits the ball very hard if not elegantly, got home against M. C. Bryant, of Charterhouse.

Palmer holed some good putts from two and three yards. At the 14th Bryant missed a crucial putt of a yard for the half after playing a beautiful run-up of 30 yards. Both these youngsters are going to be good.

PRATT'S UNUSUAL STYLE

Far and away the best golf came from G. E. Pratt, of Charterhouse, and S. K. Proctor of Harrow. Pratt has a most unusual style since he swings the club round his heels with a huge turn of the body. He delivers the blow by means of a wrench in the opposite direction. But it is, nevertheless, very effective.

Proctor, whom many thought likely to win, is on the way to being a very good striker. A little more confidence in his new and upright swing will give him additional fluency.

He was two down and four to play when, after Pratt had driven out of bounds at the 17th, Proctor went to the home hole one up. Here Pratt played a useful second some way past the flag and Proctor hit a high pitch of which any professional would have been proud, his ball finishing 12 to 10 feet from the hole. Pratt then proceeded to slot his 15-yarder for a three, Proctor being short by a couple of inches for a half.

At the 19th Proctor's second, aimed at the flag, just caught the top bunker in the green. Pratt, after a huge drive, sank his second to the right of the green, but he chipped up well and holed out like a man for his four. So another of the short-lived favourites of the week was dead and buried. Results :

FOURTH ROUND

G. F. Brook (Bromsgrove) bt J. Turnbull (Alloa), at 24th; J. W. **Shipperbottom** (Morecambe) bt N. Large (Ashton-in-Makerfield), 3 & 2; **J. G. Ewart** (George Heriot's) bt B. Stockdale (Rossall), 2 [illegible] **B. H. G. Chapman** [illegible] 3 & 2;

1952

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EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E 1824/44

FROM

Brig. R. Rayner, to McKillick.

No.

Dated 6.9.52.

Received in Registry— 16.9.52.

Arab Refugees.

Encloses letter from a constituent Mr L. Hirsh.

Last Paper

(Minutes)

CW 20/9.

References

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(How disposed of)

Brig. Rayner, M.P. to Mr Reeve, 17 Sept

(Action completed) 22/9

(Index) 10/10

Next Paper

36062

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

Minutes.

E Dir.

Since Mr. Killick is leaving for Strasbourg tomorrow, he has suggested that Mr. Reeve should reply to the attached letter from Brigadier Ralph Rayner, M.P.

I submit a draft.

C Waterlow.

C.Waterlow.

12th September,1952.

I have made some alterations to the draft which had better be fair typed before going to Mr Reeve.

J.W.S. Richmond
12/9

Mr Reeve

15/9

EW 15/9

FROM BRIGADIER RALPH RAYNER.

52, WHITEHALL COURT,
HORSE GUARDS, S. W. 1.
(WHI. 3160.)

ASHCOMBE TOWER,
NEAR DAWLISH.
(DAW. 3178.)

Asked. 10/9

1. Mr. Killick Jd 10/9
2. Kastam Dept.

8th September 1952.

FE 1824/44

Dear Mr. Killick

I have received the attached paper on Arab Relief from a gentleman in my Constituency who was a Field Welfare Officer with the Gree ce Mission and I send it on as it might possibly be worth some consideration. Would you be a kind chap and hand it on to Anthony Nutting if you consider it worth while, or to any other interested department.

Yours Sincerely,

Ralph Rayner

J. E. Killick, Esq.
Private Secretary to -
Parliamentary Under Secretary of State,
Foreign Office,
Downing Street, S.W.1.

COPY

(EE 1824/44)

Oaklands,
Tower Park,
MORETONHAMPSTEAD.

30th August, 1952.

Dear Brigadier Rayner,

Arab Refugees

You may perhaps remember having some correspondence with me early in 1949 and before, on the above matter, and that I submitted a scheme for the relief and resettlement of refugees to U.N.P.R.A. which appears to have been studied to the extent at least that my suggested surveys were made and the present relief and works organisation (U.N.W.R.A.) was set up and commenced operations.

The early press reports were promising and indicated encouraging prospects, but recent reports have indicated a less satisfactory situation, and the enclosed article by General Galloway, which appeared in yesterday's "Daily Telegraph" is most disquieting and shows that the scheme is completely bogged down, the problem unsolved, and difficulties still growing.

Such a situation after two years effort is pathetic and unnecessary, and implies a failure to attain a constructive and rational approach. May I therefore ask for the favour of your further patience and consideration of this most urgent matter?

I accept the view that the resettlement of the refugees is a difficult political issue, needing consideration at probably a higher level than U.N.W.R.A., but the main difficulty lies in the failure to demonstrate that the problem as a whole can be effectively and economically settled. We cannot expect the politicians to succeed in negotiations if they have nothing practical to discuss and bargain with.

Relief and resettlement are both matters for practical demonstration. Politicians cannot be expected to devise and operate practical schemes as well as provide the money and facilities (which they have done in this instance). Given a clear issue they will no doubt get results.

General Galloway demands a change of heart and a new outlook, and suggests that the host countries take over the relief and U.N.W.R.A. concentrate on resettlement schemes. My feeling is that had the relief which has been granted been constructive in principle and tending towards rehabilitation, it should by now be a relatively small problem and expense, and the resettlement element could have been shown sufficiently to indicate to the various host countries how much they stand to gain by resettlement rather than as at present, it having the appearance of a burden they cannot manage.

/Having

Brigadier Ralph Rayner, M.P.,
Ashcombe Tower,
DAWLISH.

Having had considerable experience of constructive relief work both at home and overseas, and some knowledge of Near-and Middle-East conditions and peoples, I appeal most earnestly for reconsideration of the principle of relief on a community basis, so that it can be made to integrate in due course, into the wider field of resettlement. Where such large numbers of people are involved this seems to be the only possible solution. Simple, or "hand-out" relief will continue indefinitely so long as there are funds or goods to be distributed, but it leads nowhere and satisfies neither the giver nor the recipient. The latter are maintained on a minimum standard of life, getting more and more disheartened as time goes on and less capable and inclined for work, for they have no incentive to help themselves, and no means with which to do so.

If the camps are developed and administered on a community basis, with the refugees helping themselves, and organising themselves into community services and activities such as they operated in their former villages and towns - agricultural workers, shoemakers, tailors, teachers, nurses, builders, labourers, shop-keepers etc., - the need for foreign relief workers and supervisors would gradually diminish, and when the time, and place, for resettlement has been decided, cadres could be sent from the camp community as an advance party, and migration arrangements for the community as a whole planned.

The individual claims of the refugees for compensation in respect of their previous residence should already have been registered and be in process of verification - as I suggested in my draft scheme. Whether or not they can ever be met by Israel is not of immediate consequence - the knowledge that a claim is registered or recorded would give some re-assurance to the refugees concerned, and to their relatives and families.

When a total claim can be guaged it may be found practicable to establish a fund from which grants can be made to the refugees on the basis of a small percentage of their claim, the grant to be in cash, goods, equipment, stock etc., bearing upon either their previous occupation or their prospective position in the new community. The claims would at least establish the position the individual refugees should occupy in the camp-communities, and their competence in work.

There must surely be a general gain from the information the claims would give, if it is properly studied and used, and not the least value would lie in showing in what forms re-settlement should take - new agricultural or industrial communities, or expansion of existing communities etc. etc. Bearing in mind that these refugees were previously self-supporting, we tend to lose by this delay, their aptitudes, or the experience they have gained in industry of some kind, when perhaps it may be possible at a relatively small cost to re-establish them in much the same occupation as they had before. It is possible that very many would show initiative and enterprise, given encouragement and an opportunity to do so. Modern equipment and establishments may be an ideal to aim for, but they take time and money to organise, and require continued supervision. Many of the refugees would no doubt

/be

be content to have the primitive arrangements and kit they were brought up with, and be capable of maintaining themselves and their families with them.

These points, which I have so briefly scouted over, are worthy of careful consideration, and preferably by people of a wide experience in relief work. If U.N.O. has an under-50 age rule for its staff it needs to be modified in such a matter as this, even if only for consultation purposes. The 1914-18 War class can still stand up to hard work, and it probably had a measure of practical experience also. General Galloway speaks of an inflated central administration which is remote from the field staff and field work and gets nothing done. It was much the same with U.N.R.R.A. - I was a Field Welfare Officer with the Greece Mission, and we need only to see the continuing dependency of Greece on outside aid, in spite of the huge effort and fortune dispensed by U.N.R.R.A. and since to see that the system fails lamentably. Relief and rehabilitation are live and technical subjects, and not just supply and distribution services, but it seems to be taking us a long time to learn the lesson and at the cost of much human suffering.

May I therefore appeal for your patient consideration of this whole subject, in the hope that there may be some way of getting a new outlook and service upon it. A solution of the refugee problem must be found sometime, for the well-being of Europe depends upon it, but it does not get easier with the passage of time and the wastage of effort and money.

With apologies for trespassing upon your time, and my poor effort on the typewriter.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd.) L. Huish

(L. Huish)

Registry No. [illegible]

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Open.

Draft. Letter

To: R.H.

Brig. Ralph Rayner, M.P.,
Ashcombe Tower,
Dawlish,
N. Devon.

From:

Mr. J.E. Reeve.
Minister of State's Office.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

RECEIVED IN DIVISION
16 SEP 1952
SENT TO TYPE
DESPATCHED

Original despatched by Min's Dept. 17/9

Before Mr. Killick left for Strasbourg with Mr Nutting he asked if I would reply to your letter to him of 8th Sept enclosing one from your constituent about Arab Refugees OUTSIDE

Your letter of September 8th to Mr. Killick with which you enclosed a paper from one of your constituents about the Arab Refugee problem, has been passed to me, since both Anthony Nutting and Mr. Killick are now, as you may know, in Strasbourg.

2. The Foreign Office is in full agreement with your constituent regarding the desirability of pressing ahead with practical resettlement schemes for the refugees. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency possesses the necessary technical organisation to carry out such schemes; and, as your constituent points out, adequate funds have been made available by the international community for at least a beginning to be made with major resettlement projects. There are, however, three major obstacles; first the fact that some three quarters of the refugees are in Jordan and the Gaza strip, which are territories whose natural resources, even if fully developed, would be insufficient to enable them to absorb them; secondly the reluctance of those Arab countries such as Syria and Iraq, where large scale re-settlement possibilities exist, to agree to admit refugees over and above those already within their borders; and thirdly the unwillingness of the refugees themselves to accept re-settlement for fear of prejudicing their rights to return eventually to their original homes. U.N.R.W.A.'s record is not however completely negative. The Jordan Government has accepted an eleven million dollar programme of small re-integration and re-employment schemes, and

/surveys

surveys are being carried out for a major irrigation project in the Jordan valley. Negotiations for the settlement of the 80,000 refugees in Syria are taking place with the Syrian Government. "The Times" of the 12th September reports that the Political Committee of the Arab League has discussed the question of refugee re-settlement from the point of view of the willingness of the members of the League to agree not merely to the principle of resettlement (as it did at last year's General Assembly) but to the execution of agreed resettlement plans. If the League's decision on this matter is favourable, it should greatly ~~gradually~~ strengthen the Arab Governments in overcoming what is at present one of the main obstacles - the fear of their own public opinion.

Your constituent's suggestion that the refugee camps should be administered and organised on a community basis is a valuable one. We understand that the Agency is in fact carrying out such a policy as far as is practicable.

Finally, your constituent suggests that the individual claims of the refugees for compensation should be registered and verified. As you may know, the compensation question is one of the most thorny aspects of the refugee problem. The Palestine Conciliation Commission, in their report to the last session of the Assembly, put forward a global estimate of the total value of immovable and movable property abandoned by the refugees, amounting to £100m and £20m respectively. Arrangements for estimating individual claims through a study of the appropriate records of the former Mandate Government are now under consideration.

/H.M.G.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

H.M.G., although not represented on the P.C.C., are doing all they can to promote a solution to this problem.

I hope that these comments will be of some assistance to your constituent. I return his letter herewith.

15/9

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

(EE 784/44) 17th September, 1952.

OUTFILE

Before Mr. Killick left for Strasbourg with Mr. Nutting he asked if I would reply to your letter to him of the 8th September enclosing one from your constituent about Arab Refugees.

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Brigadier R.H. Rayner, M.P., /accept
Ashcombe Tower,
Dawlish,
North Devon.

accept resettlement for fear of prejudicing their rights to return eventually to their original homes. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency's record is not however completely negative. The Jordan Government has accepted an eleven million dollar programme of small re-integration and re-employment schemes, and surveys are being carried out for a major irrigation project in the Jordan valley. Negotiations for the settlement of the 80,000 refugees in Syria are taking place with the Syrian Government. "The Times" of the 12th September reports that the Political Committee of the Arab League has discussed the question of refugee re-settlement from the point of view of the willingness of the members of the League to agree not merely to the principle of resettlement (as it did at last year's General Assembly) but to the execution of agreed resettlement plans. If the League's decision on this matter is favourable, it should greatly strengthen the Arab Governments in overcoming what is at present one of the main obstacles - the fear of their own public opinion.

/Your

Your constituent's suggestion that the refugee camps should be administered and organised on a community basis is a valuable one. We understand that the Agency is in fact carrying out such a policy as far as is practicable.

Finally, your constituent suggests that the individual claims of the refugees for compensation should be registered and verified. As you may know, the compensation question is one of the most thorny aspects of the refugee problem. The Palestine Conciliation Commission, in their report to the last session of the Assembly, put forward a global estimate of the total value of immovable and movable property abandoned by the refugees, amounting to £100m and £20m respectively. Arrangements for estimating individual claims through a study of the appropriate records of the former Mandate Government are now under consideration. Her Majesty's Government, although not represented on the Palestine Conciliation Commission, are doing all they can to promote a solution to this problem.

I hope that these comments will be of some assistance to your constituent. I return his letter herewith.

(J.E. Reeve)
Asst. P.S. to Min of State

1952

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E E1824/45

FROM

Mr T. Rapp.

Faigid

No. ~~to~~ Mr Richmond

Dated 182/38/1.

Received in Registry— 13.9.52. 17.9.52.

Discusses an article in the News Cronicle of ~~[illegible]~~ 2nd September by Clare Hollingworth attacking UNRWA.

Last Paper

References

-/+2

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Action completed) 21/9/52

(Index) 10/10

Next Paper

(*MINUTES*)

I don't think the Economist will join in, and I feel sure Miss Monroe wd let me know if she were contemplating doing so.

JWBR 23/9

I.P.D. C.J.M.G. 25/9.

39451

Ewer.

182/38/1

CONFIDENTIAL

BRITISH MIDDLE EAST OFFICE,
~~10 SHARIA TOLUMBAT,~~
~~CAIRO~~
Political Division,
GHQ. MELF 17.

13th September, 1952.

E7524/45

My dear Richmond,

I notice that Clare Hollingworth unleashed an attack on UNWRAP in the News Chronicle of September 2nd last. Clare Hollingworth visited the Levant States and Egypt in the early spring on behalf, as she then represented, of the Economist. When I met her in Cairo she told me some of the impressions she had received when visiting Beirut and refugee camps, and asked me whether I saw any valid reason why they should not be published forthwith. I suggested to her that it was only fair to give the Blandford plan for resettlement a trial and that the publication of such matter at that particular juncture might prejudice the organisation and the chances of resettlement agreements. She accepted this view and restrained herself for several months, but has now broken silence. I have no idea what further attacks she meditates, or whether the Economist is also likely to join in.

Yours ever,

T. C. Rapp

(T. C. RAPP)

J. C. B. Richmond, Esq.,
Middle East Secretariat,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

RECEIVED IN C
17 SEP 1952
SENT TO
وارد

1952

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E E1824/46

FROM

Press Extract (Daily Telegraph)

No.

Dated 15.9.52.

Received in Registry— 18.9.52.

Arab Refugees.

Letter to the Editor from Michael Arnon, Press Attaché at Israel Legation on "Israel's hopes for Refugees".

Last Paper

References

E 3214	1821	31 (1949)
8252		
8257	—	--
8358		
8495		

(Print)

(How disposed of)

Dfy) U.K. Delegation, New York. from MEP 20ct.

Copy) Sir H. Knight, W'ra Tel Aviv. 20ct

(Action completed) [signature] 8/10

(Index) [signature] 24/11

Next Paper

(Minutes)

This is a useful statement of Israel's attitude to the Arab refugee problem generally, & I think it might be worth copying it to Sir H. Knight at Beirut, Tel Aviv, UK Del New York, & Washington.

The statement about compensation at X does not seem correct. I submit a draft letter to New York. (Held up for pp.)

E Dept (Mr Pullar)

C Waterlow 29/9

CW 4/10

36062

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

Minutes.

In a letter to the Times of 15th Sept. the Israeli Press Attaché referred to a scheme for the reunion of Arab families separated by the exodus of 1948 which was initiated by the Israel Govt in 1949 and is still in operation.

Have we any p.p. about this scheme?

E. Division
Library

J.W.S. Richmond
5/11

E 3214
8252
8257
8358
8495
1821 | 31

& 1949

~~Mr Wilson~~

Will you make a note of the references of the 1949 p.p. in case this question works up again

J.W.S.
17/11

E. Div

(30276) G.S.St.

DAILY TELEGRAPH

Cutting dated 15 SEP 1952, 195

E 1824 40 E

Israel's Hopes For Refugees

Efforts to Solve Arab Problem

To the Editor of The Daily Telegraph

SIR—Both for humanitarian and political reasons, the Israel authorities are vitally interested to see an early, lasting and constructive solution of the problem of the Arab refugees. With this in view they have from the outset participated in the various international relief efforts directed to that end.

It is their firm conviction that the problem, which had its origin in the aggression of the Arab States against the nascent State of Israel, can be solved only within the framework of a general peace settlement between Israel and her neighbours. Within that framework, the Israel Government is always ready to consider the refugee problem, and to accord it first place on the agenda of any such negotiations.

Unfortunately, however, there has so far been no response from the Arab side to Israel's repeated suggestions, or to the admonitions of the United Nations, in favour of the initiation of peace talks.

The Israel Government remains firm in its view that the wholesale return of the refugees to Israel is impossible. Hard as this undoubtedly is, the wheel of history cannot be turned back.

It must be remembered that since the exodus of most of Israel's Arab population, more than 700,000 Jews (including some 300,000 refugees from Moslem countries) have come in, straining the country's absorptive capacity to its utmost limit. In Israel moreover, a small country still surrounded by unappeased enemies, vital security considerations preclude the re-settlement of any substantial number of people whose past actions bear witness to their bitter hostility.

In spite of this the Israel Government expressed its readiness, at the Lausanne Conference of the Palestine Conciliation Commission in 1949, to take back 100,000 of these refugees as an integral part of a general peace settlement. This offer was ignored by the Arab States, and has since lapsed.

None the less, Israel has consistently endeavoured to contribute her share towards the solution of the problem. Her representatives are discussing some of its aspects with United Nations representatives in New York, and I should like to state briefly what has been done.

The United Nations recommended that every country harbouring Arab refugees should endeavour to reintegrate them into its own economy. The 23,000 Arab refugees within Israel have now been fully integrated, economically and politically, and have been taken off the relief rolls of the United Nations Relief Works Agency.

A scheme for the reunion of Arab families separated by the 1948 exodus was initiated by the Israel Government in 1949, and is still in operation. Several thousands of refugees have returned to their homes in Israel under this scheme, in spite of the lack of co-operation from the Arab States.

Israel stands committed to the payment of compensation to non-returning Arab refugees for the lands they have abandoned in Israel. The Israel authorities' view that a global estimate of the value of such property, followed by a lump sum payment, would conform to international practice, is shared by the United Nations Conciliation Commission. It has been agreed that a global assessment shall be made, and

RECEIVED IN C.B.
13 SEP 1952
SENT TO DEPT.



NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

See below

Registry
No. EE1824/46

~~Top Secret.~~
Secret.
Confidential.
~~Restricted.~~
Open.

Draft.

to.
UK Delegation
New York

from
M.E. Secretariat

Copy with
encl. to
Sir H. Knight,
Beirut

Washington,
Tel Aviv.

Mr Phillips

20/9

RECEIVED IN DIVISION
- 2 OCT 1952
SENDING TYPE 2/10
DESPATCHED DL.

(14487) 2/52

+3c

Dear ~~Chancery~~ Delegation, 2/12

OUTFILE

We refer to our Washington's letter 2/5 Sept 19th

OUTFILE

ER1155/20 of ~~Aug. 31st~~ and preceding correspondence about compensation for the Arab refugees.

We enclose a copy of a letter to the Daily Telegraph, dated Sept. 15th, from Michael Arnon, Attaché of the Israel Legation, about the Arab refugee problem generally. You will see that with reference to compensation Mr Arnon states that "the Israel authorities view that a global estimate of the value of such property, followed by a lump sum payment, would conform to international practice, is shared by the P.C.C. It has been agreed that a global assessment shall be made, and agreement reached

on the proportion which Israel can be asked to pay."
This is contrary to our understanding of the position, which is that the PCC has now agreed, presumably with Israel's consent, to ~~work~~ proceed with the task of assessing individual claims (thereby of course implying that payments will be made to individuals), & that an Office is being set up in New York under Bernecastle's direction for this purpose (see para 7 of ~~your~~ Crosthwaite's letter No 1077/59/52 of Sept 23rd to Woodrop.)
We should be grateful for your comments.

We are sending copies of this letter & enclosure to Sir H. Knight at Beirut, & to Chancery at Tel Aviv & Washington.

Yours ever
M.E. Secretariat. [signature] 1/10

(In math in Div.)

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

OUTFILE

(EE 1824/46) FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

CONFIDENTIAL 2nd October, 1952.

Dear Delegation,

We refer to Wardrop's letter ER 1155/20 of the 19th September and preceeding correspondence about compensation for the Arab refugees.

---2. We enclose a copy of a letter to the Daily Telegraph dated the 15th September, from Michael Arnon, Press Attaché to the Israel Legation, about the Arab refugee problem generally. You will see that with reference to compensation Mr. Arnon states that "The Israel authorities view that a global estimate of the value of such property, followed by a lump sum payment, would conform to international practice, is shared by the Palestine Conciliation Commission. It has been agreed that a global assessment shall be made, and agreement reached on the proportion which Israel can be asked to pay". This is contrary to our understanding of the position, which is that the P.C.C. has now agreed, presumably with Israel's consent, to proceed with the task of assessing individual claims (thereby of course implying that payments will be made to individuals), and that an office is being set up in New York under Berncastle's direction for the purpose (see paragraph 7 of Crosthwaite's letter No. 1077/59/52 of the 23rd September to Wardrop). We shall be grateful for your comments.

We are sending copies of this letter and enclosure to Sir Henry Knight at Beirut and the Chanceries at Tel Aviv and Washington.

Yours ever,

MIDDLE EAST SECRETARIAT.

United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations.
New York.

1952

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E E 1824/47

FROM

U.N.R.W.A.
Beirut
Comm'd.

No.

Dated 17/9.

Received in Registry— 26/9/52.

Transmits an extract from "Le Jour" reporting on the press conference during which the situation of Palestine refugees was discussed.

182

References

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Action completed) 3/10

(Index) 10/10

MINUTES

Mr Locke has told Lebanese journalists that he is making a point of personally visiting refugee camps & homes & talking to the refugees themselves. He considers that their condition is more serious now than at any time hitherto, & that in particular, their morale is weakening.

C Waterlow.
1/10.

This press conference has displeased Blandford (see final para of enclosure to Sir T. Rapps letter of 27th Sept at EE 18216/20)

JWBR
1/10

42863

UNCLASSIFIED

E E/1824/47.

J.C.B. Richmond, Esq.,
Middle East Secretariat,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

WITH THE COMPLIMENTS

OF

United Kingdom Delegation
Advisory Commission UNRWA
BEIRUT

c/o British Legation,
Beirut.

17th September, 1952.


RECEIVED IN G.B
26 SEP 1952
SENT TO DEPT.
27/9

Extract from "Le Jour" of 14/9/52.

Conférence de presse de M. Edwin Locke

"La situation des réfugiés palestiniens est plus grave aujourd'hui qu'elle ne l'a jamais été auparavant"



M. l'ambassadeur Edwin A. Locke (à droite) photographié au cours de la conférence de presse tenue hier au bureau de l'U SIS

M. Edwin Locke, représentant des Etats-Unis à la Commission consultative de l'UNRWA, a tenu hier une conférence de presse au siège de l'U.S.I.S. à Beyrouth à laquelle ont assisté de nombreux journalistes. On se souvient qu'il y a quelques jours à l'issue d'une réunion avec plusieurs personnalités palestiniennes, M. Locke avait promis de visiter les réfugiés dans leurs camps puis de communiquer son impression à la presse.

L'Ambassadeur américain qui etait entouré de M. Louis Bresson, son assistant, et M. Winfield Lyon, directeur du Bureau d'Information américain récemment rentré d'un voyage aux Etats-Unis, a fait la déclaration que voici :

"Il y a quelques jours, j'avais convenu de vous rencontrer bientôt pour discuter les problèmes des réfugiés arabes.

"Il n'y a pas d'autre moyen de connaître les réfugiés et de comprendre leurs problèmes que de leur rendre personnellement visite, dans leurs camps et ailleurs. J'ai consacré beaucoup de temps cet été à m'entretenir avec les réfugiés et leurs chefs que j'ai vus et entendus personnellement.

"Je me suis entretenu longuement cette seamine avec le Dr Izzat Tannous et ses collègues. Plus tard j'ai visité le camp de Tall ez-Zatar, près de Beyrouth. Je me suis rendu jeudi au camp de Nahr el-Bared au Liban-Nord, et j'ai visité ensuite un nombre considérable de réfugiés à Tripoli. Cet après-midi je partirai pour le camp du Pont du Pacha, situé sur la route de Beit-Méry.

"Je suis convaincu que c'est là le seul moyen de se rapprocher des réfugiés et de comprendre leur situation.

étrangers les voient et les consultent rarement. Les gens penchent à penser que les pires jours sont passés et que les problèmes touchant ces malheureux ont été presque résolus. Nous devons leur rappeler qu'il n'en est pas encore ainsi. Nous avons devant nous un chemin long et difficile, qui demande une compréhension, une bonne voolnté et une coopération extrêmes de la part de tous les intéressés.

"Je me rendrai la semaine prochaine en Jordanie et, peu après, en Syrie et à Gaza, afin d'observer davantage, personnellement, les conditions de vie des réfugiés qui s'y trouvent, d'enregistrer leurs espoirs et leurs appréhensions et de comprendre autant que possible ce qu'on peut mieux faire pour améliorer leur sort.

"Je transmettrai à mon Gouvernement, en temps dû, mes impressions et les conclusions résultant de mes derniers contacts et j'espère qu'en même temps je serai en mesure d'en discuter avec vous."

1952

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E E 1824/48

FROM

Peter Smithers, M.P.

to Selwyn Lloyd.

No.

Dated 23. 9. 52.

Received in Registry— 3. 10. 52.

Arab Refugees.

Discusses a conversation which he had with Sir H. Knight when he was in Beirut.

Last Paper

References

(Print)

(How disposed of)

Mr P. Smithers, M.P. for Lord Reading 3 Oct.

Sir H. Knight, Beirut for Sir J. Bowker 3 Oct

(Action completed) 6/10

(Index) 10/10

Next Paper

(Minutes)

N) F.O. Minute (Mr Richmond) of 25/9

7/10

36062

Enter

EE 1825/48

Mr Peter Smithers, M.P., has written to the Minister of State to describe a conversation with Sir Henry Knight in Beirut about the United Nations Relief and Works Agency.

2. U.N.R.W.A. was set up by a United Nations resolution of the 8th December, 1949, to carry out relief for refugees and "to consult with the interested Near Eastern Governments concerning measures to be taken by them preparatory to the time when international assistance for relief and works projects is no longer available". The General Assembly have since endorsed - in January of this year - a $250.m. three-year programme of relief and reintegration for refugees proposed by U.N.R.W.A. for the period 1st July, 1951, to the 30th June, 1954. In this programme $200.m. were earmarked for reintegration and $50.m. for relief. It was hoped that the sums to be expended on relief would progressively diminish as reintegration proceeded. The $50.m. for relief were accordingly intended to be spent as follows :

$27.m.	for	1951-52
$18.m.	"	1952-53 and
$5.m.	"	1953-54.

This programme was an optimistic one. Complete resettlement of the refugees cannot be achieved without transporting many of them from their present locations to places where greater economic possibilities exist. These economic possibilities themselves need developing before refugees can be absorbed. For these reasons, among others, fulfillment of the plan depends on full co-operation from the Arab Governments and from the refugees themselves. For political reasons such co-operation is not easily obtained and practically no progress has yet been made in resettling refugees. There is little doubt that this problem will be with us for some time after 1954.

3. When he was recently home on leave, Sir Henry Knight discussed future policy with Sir James Bowker and it was agreed that, in spite of the lack of progress towards reintegration so far, we should support the continuation of the three-year programme at this year's General Assembly and that the question should be reconsidered at the end of the present United Nations financial year (the 30th June 1953). Sir Henry Knight has not given us any indication that he wishes to alter this policy nor sent us any further views on future policy for submission to Ministers.

4. Sir Henry Knight's letters at Flags A and B show that he has been worried about possible divergence of views between ourselves and the Americans on two points : i. the level of U.N.R.W.A.'s relief budget for 1952-53 ; and ii. general future policy towards U.N.R.W.A.

/5. His apprehensions ...

Flag C

5. His apprehensions on the first point have now been relieved by the State Department's proposal (Washington telegram No. 957 Saving) to authorise the Agency to increase forthwith their relief budget for 1952-53 to $22.m. from the $18.m. laid down in the Agency's programme which was approved by last year's General Assembly. This upward revision will require the General Assembly's sanction but there is no reason to suppose that this will not be forthcoming. The money can be made available by transfer from the Agency's re-integration budget, which is most unlikely to be fully spent.

Flag D.

6. Sir Henry Knight's fear of divergence between the United Kingdom and the United States' future policy towards U.N.R.W.A. seems to have been caused by the attitude of the American representative on the Advisory Commission. It appears from Bailey's letter to Richmond of the 20th Sept 1952 (22221/121/52) ~~1952~~, that this attitude is not fully in line with that of the State Department which accords closely with our own. A copy of this letter will now have been received by Sir Henry Knight.

7. I am not sure when Mr Smithers was in Beirut, but it looks as if his conversation with Sir Henry Knight must have taken place before these apprehensions had been relieved. I therefore suggest that a letter should be sent to Sir Henry Knight on the lines of the attached draft, and I also submit a draft reply to Mr Smithers.

Sir J. Bowker.

J.C.B. Richmond

(J. C. B. Richmond.)
25th September 1952.

I agree with the draft letters.
We shall certainly have to be thinking about plans for the future in the probable event of further

further cocktail progress
with the Blandford plan.

Sir R. Malfiss.

R. J. Bowker
29/9

Roy
29/9

Private Secretary
to Minister of State.

Mr. O'Regan Pmk
Lord Reading
R. 1/10.

[illegible] 7/10

PETER SMITHERS, M. P., 30, WILTON CRESCENT, S. W. 1.

1. M/S. Seen
2. UN (E2S) Dept for early off reply.
J Reeve. 24/9

E1824/48

23rd September, 1952.

Middle East Secretariat.
I think this is yours.
AA Dudley 25/9

Dear Selwyn

I was recently in Beirut on my way back from Central Africa, and had an opportunity to talk with Sir Henry Knightwho, as you know, is the British representative on the United Nations Organization dealing with Arab Refugees in the Middle East. Sir Henry described to me at some length the complicated and rather unsatisfactory position which confronts the organization in that on the one hand the available finance does not appear to be sufficient to enable the objectives to be carried out, and on the other American policy towards the organization is at present uncertain.

From what Sir Henry had to say, I felt that he wanted an opportunity of putting his views and suggestions with regard to future policy before a Minister; and in view of your forthcoming visit to the United States and of the key position occupied by the Americans in this matter, there seems to me to be something to be said for such a course.

I hope you will not regard this letter as an impertinence, in case the matter has already been dealt with.

Yours ever,

Peter

The Rt. Hon. Selwyn Lloyd, C.B.E., T.D., Q.C., M.P.,

Registry
No. EE1824/48

~~Top Secret.~~
Secret.
Confidential.
~~Restricted.~~
Open.

Draft.

Peter Smithers,
Esq., M.P.,
30, Wilton
Crescent, S.W. 1.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

RECEIVED IN DIVISION
- 3 OCT 1952
SENT TO
TYPE

FROM :
~~The Minister~~
of ~~State.~~
Lord Reading

LORD READING'S OFFICE
3-OCT 1952
LETTER DESPATCHED BY

R. J. Bowker
29/9

LETTER DESPATCHED BY
3-OCT 1952
LORD READING'S OFFICE

R. 1/10

Wt. 11647 234 250m 7/51 V.P.Co. 51-8078

Middle East Secretariat,
FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W. 1.

September, 1952.

Thank you for your letter of the 23rd September regarding your conversation with Sir Henry Knight about the future of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency.

As you probably know, the Agency was set up by a United Nations resolution of the 8th December, 1949, to carry out direct relief for the refugees and "to consult with the interested Near Eastern Governments concerning measures to be taken by them preparatory to the time when international assistance for relief and works projects is no longer available". An Advisory Commission consisting of representatives of France, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States was established by the same resolution to assist the Director of the Agency. The General Assembly have since endorsed, in January of this year, a $250.m. three-year programme for relief and reintegration which was proposed by the U.N.R.W.A. for the period 1st July, 1951 to the 30th June, 1954. Of the $250.m., $200.m. were intended for reintegration and $50.m. for relief. It was hoped that the sums to be expended on relief would progressively diminish as reintegration proceeded. This programme was optimistic. A complete resettlement of the refugees cannot be achieved without transferring many of them from their present locations to places where greater economic possibilities exist. These economic possibilities, which are mainly in Syria, need developing before refugees can be absorbed. For these reasons, many

/among others, ...

among others, fulfillment of the plan depends on the full co-operation of the Arab Governments and of the refugees themselves. For political reasons, this co-operation is not easily obtained and little progress has yet been made in reintegration of refugees. There is not much doubt that this ~~programme~~ problem will be with us for some time after 1954.

Nevertheless, there seems no alternative to pressing forward with the resettlement programme and it was agreed with Sir Henry Knight when he was recently home on leave, that, in spite of lack of progress towards resettlement so far, we should support continuation of the three-year programme at this year's General Assembly. Sir Henry Knight has not given us any indication that he wishes this policy to be altered. His recent letters to the Department, however, have indicated his fears that the United States Government were not in complete agreement with us on this policy. In particular, he expressed the fear that they would insist on limiting the amount available for the Agency to spend on relief during 1952-53 to the $18.m. laid down in the programme. Recent correspondence with Washington shows that his fears on this point are unfounded and that the thinking of the State Department on this question is closely in accord with our own. Copies of this correspondence have been sent to Sir Henry Knight.

/I hope, therefore, ...

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

I hope, therefore, that his immediate fears are now at rest. He is, however, being informed ~~by~~ of your letter and will doubtless let us know whether he has any further views which he ~~would~~ likely to communicate before ~~my~~ Selwyn Lloyd's departure for New York.

(S. Lloyd.)

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

(35941) Wt.17563/163 50,000 6/48 A.& E.W.Ltd. Gp.685
(36841) Wt.31782/171 85,000 11/48 " - "

FOREIGN OFFICE,
S.W.1.

(EE 1824/48) 3rd October, 1952.

OUTFILL

In Selwyn Lloyd's absence I am writing to thank you for your letter of the 23rd September regarding your conversation with Sir Henry Knight about the future of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency.

As you probably know, the Agency was set up by a United Nations resolution of the 8th December, 1949, to carry out direct relief for the refugees and "to consult with the interested Near Eastern Governments concerning measures to be taken by them preparatory to the time when international assistance for relief and workd projects is no longer available". An Advisory Commission consisting of representatives of France, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States was established by the same resolution to assist the Director of the Agency. The General Assembly have since endorsed, in January of this year, a £250 million three-year programme for relief and reintegration which was proposed by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for the period 1st July, 1951 to the 30th June, 1954. Of the £250 million, £200 million were intended for reintegration and £50 million for relief. It was hoped that the sums to be expended on relief would progressively diminish as reintegration proceeded. This programme was optimistic. A complete resettlement of the refugees cannot be achieved without transferring many of them from their present locations to places

/where

Peter Smithers, Esq., M.P.,
30, Wilton Crescent,
S.W.1.

where greater economic possibilities exist. These economic possibilities, which are mainly in Syria, need developing before refugees can be absorbed. For these reasons, among others, fulfillment of the plan depends on the full co-operation of the Arab Governments and of the refugees themselves. For political reasons, this co-operation is not easily obtained and little progress has yet been made in reintegration of refugees. There is not much doubt that this problem will be with us for some time after 1954.

Nevertheless, there seems no alternative to pressing forward with the resettlement programme and it was agreed with Sir Henry Knight when he was recently home on leave, that, in spite of lack of progress towards resettlement so far, we should support continuation of the three-year programme at this year's General Assembly. Sir Henry Knight has not given us any indication that he wishes this policy to be altered. His recent letters to the Department, however, have indicated his fears that the United States Government were not in complete agreement with us on this policy. In particular, he expressed the fear that they would insist on limiting the amount available for the Agency to spend on relief during 1952-53 to the £18 million laid down in the programme. Recent correspondence with Washington shows that his fears on this point are unfounded and that the thinking of the State Department on this question is closely in accord with our own. Copies of this correspondence have been sent to Sir Henry Knight.

I hope, therefore, that his immediate fears are now at rest. He is, however, being informed of your letter and will doubtless let us know whether he has any further views which he would like to communicate before Selwyn Lloyd's departure for New York.

READING

(Mr Richmond.)
Registry
No.

~~Top Secret~~.
~~Secret~~
~~Confidential~~.
Restricted.
~~Open~~.

Draft.

Sir Henry Knight,
K.C.S.I., C.I.E.,
c/o British
Legation,
Beirut.

FROM :
Sir James Bowker.

Middle East Secretariat,
FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W. 1.

OUTFILE
10c

September, 1952.

Mr Peter Smithers, M.P., has written to the Minister of State to inform him of your conversation with him in Beirut.

2. In this letter he said that you had described to him "the rather unsatisfactory position that confronts the Organization [U.N.R.W.A.] in that, on the one hand, the available finances do not appear to be sufficient to enable the objectives to be carried out, and on the other, that American policy towards the Organization is at present uncertain". We assume that this refers to the anxieties expressed in your letters to Richmond (AC 197 of 3rd & 5th Sept. and AC 248 of 10th Sept.) and we hope that Washington Saving telegram No. 957 of the 13th Sept. and Bailey's letter to Richmond No. 22221/121/52 of 26th Sept. will by now have relieved them.

3. Mr Smithers formed the impression that you wanted an opportunity of putting your views about future policy before a Minister. If you have any particular points which you think ought to be put to the Minister of State before he leaves for the General Assembly on the 12th October, perhaps you will let us know by telegraph.

R.J.B.

(J. Bowker.)

RECEIVED IN DIVISION
30 OCT 1952

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

(27274) Wt. 22831—216 325m 11/50 G.S. St.

(EE 1824/48)

RESTRICTED

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

3rd October, 1952.

Mr. Peter Smithers, M.P., has written to the Minister of State to inform him of your conversation with him in Beirut.

2. In this letter he said that you had described to him "the rather unsatisfactory position that confronts the organization /United Nations Relief and Works Agency/ in that, on the one hand, the available finances do not appear to be sufficient to enable the objectives to be carried out, and on the other, that United States policy towards the organization is at present uncertain". We assume that this refers to the anxieties expressed in your letters to Richmond (AC 197 of 3rd and 5th September and AC 248 of 10th September) and we hope that Washington Saving telegram No. 957 of the 13th September and Bailey's letter to Richmond No. 22221/121/52 of 20th September will by now have relieved them.

3. Mr. Smithers formed the impression that you wanted an opportunity of putting your views about future policy before a Minister. If you have any particular points which you think ought to be put to the Minister of State before he leaves for the General Assembly on the 12th October, perhaps you will let us know by telegraph.

(R. J. Bowker)

Sir Henry Knight, K.C.S.I., C.I.E.,

Beirut.

1952

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E 1824/49

FROM

Sir H Knight
Beirut
to Mr Richmond

No. AC. 246.

Dated

Received in Registry— 9. 9. 52. 6. 10. 52.

Arab Refugees.

Enclosure draft letter to Lady Astor, on ways of helping the refugees.

References

-/50

MINUTES

Now see 51. 2/50.

PW 6/10.

(Print)

(How disposed of)

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

(Action completed)	(Index)
PW 6/10	10/10

42863

Before he returned to Beirut, Sir Henry Knight was asked by Lady Astor for suggestions about how the Palestine refugees could best be helped, and he promised to write to her from Lebanon. He now asks us to vet the letter which he has written and, if we approve, to send it on to Lady Astor.

2. I quite agree that it is important to keep this problem before the British and American public, and the danger that funds for relief to refugees may dry up is real. I also agree that United Nations, United States and ~~the~~ United Kingdom policies in the past must share with Israelis and Arabs responsibility for the catastrophe of the refugees.

3. I am not sure, however, about the wisdom of inviting Lady Astor, as Sir Henry Knight's letter implicitly does, to stimulate publicity on this subject and I am sure it would be unwise to give Lady Astor reason to assume that such publicity would have the approval of the Foreign Office. I think this would be the effect of Sir Henry Knight's paragraph 11. Altogether, I should prefer Sir Henry Knight's letter to be more on the lines of the attached draft.

4. Before writing to Sir Henry Knight in this sense I should be glad of the views of Eastern Department.

J.C.B. Richmond

Eastern Dept. (J.C.B.Richmond.)
17th September 1952.

I quite agree. Not only would it be unwise to give Lady Astor the idea at X, but it would be positively dangerous in writing to her to express such opinions as figure in paras. 6 and 8 of Sir H. Knight's letter.

James C Wardrop
18/9

Letter to Sir H. Knight.

J.C.B.R.
19/9

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

(26164) Wt. 8841-209 200m 5/50 G.S.St.

United Kingdom Delegation
Advisory Commission UNRWA
BEIRUT

E

(AC 246)

CONFIDENTIAL

c/o British Legation,

BEIRUT.

9th September, 1952.

E1824/49

Dear Richmond,

You will remember that just before I left London I mentioned that I had been rung up by Lady Astor and had promised to write to her after I returned to Beirut.

2. I have been thinking over what to say to her and as a result have written the enclosed letter of which I send an extra copy.

3. You will see that I am rather nervous of what I have said, perhaps being more than I ought to communicate to an outsider and that, therefore, I am sending it through Middle East Secretariat so that if it is approved it may be posted on to Lady Astor and if not, may be suppressed and I shall be told to have a shot at writing something less embarrassing.

Yours sincerely,

(H.F. KNIGHT)

J.C.B. Richmond, Esq.,
Middle East Secretariat,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

P.S. I enclose 2 extra copies, if the letter be approved, perhaps Washington & UKDEL should have them

Registry
No.

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Open.

Draft.

The Viscountess
Astor, C.H.,
35, Hill Street,
W. 1.

FROM :
Sir Henry Knight.

British Legation,

BEIRUT.

September, 1952.

I must apologise for not having written sooner as I had intended when I talked about Arab refugees on the telephone before I left London. But since getting back to Beirut a fortnight ago I have had a great deal to discuss with my colleagues and also I have had to visit Damascus and Amman.

2. As you probably know, U.N.R.W.A. was set up by the United Nations in December, 1949, to "carry out relief and works programmes" and to "consult with the interested Middle East Governments about measures they could take to prepare for the time when international assistance is no longer available. Because they proved so costly and because they did not more than temporarily diminish the number of refugees in need of relief, the works programmes were later abandoned, but under the so-called New Programme, approved by the General Assembly early this year, U.N.R.W.A. seeks to concentrate on resettlement of the refugees whose rights to return to their original homes, or to compensation, are formally reserved. The intention behind this programme is to enable relief expenditure to be progressively diminished as resettlement proceeds.

3. The difficulties in the way of this programme are, however, most formidable, and practically no resettlement has been achieved. The distribution of the refugees between the territories of Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and the Egyptian-administered Gaza Strip is most unfavourable to resettlement. Syria

/is virtually .....

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Wt. 11647/234 250m 7/51 V.P.Co. 51-8078

is virtually the only one of these countries where substantial resettlement possibilities exist and there are fewer refugees in Syria than in any of the other territories mentioned. In the tiny area of the Gaza Strip, where there is no possibility of resettlement at all, more than 200,000 refugees are crowded. Political factors also ~~are~~ militated against resettlement. The Middle East Governments have to pay regard to public opinion in their own countries and this opinion continues to demand the impossible - that the refugees should return to their original homes - and looks on their resettlement elsewhere as a further surrender to Israel. U.N.R.W.A.'s efforts to consult with Middle East Governments in preparation for the time when international assistance is no longer available have therefore been met with great caution and much evasion. Although the recent Arab League meeting has given signs of a more positive attitude towards resettlement by the Arab Governments, there is still reason to fear that Western funds will dry up before substantial resettlement has taken place and that the refugees will then either starve or turn to violent courses.

4. The human aspect of the problem is heart-rending. Few people realise that most of the nearly one-million refugees now homeless were decent, self-respecting small farmers, that a number of them are highly educated and cultivated people, and that a large number - some 60,000, I believe - are Christians.

5. You were kind enough to ask me to suggest

/some way of .....

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

some way of helping these refugees. I think the most useful, immediate and practical help would be the supply of clothing for everyone ; educational help in the form of books, writing materials, etc., for primary schools, or special medical help for, for instance, tubercular refugees. Our relief funds do not run beyond the barest necessities though the Red Cross has done much to help by collecting gifts of clothing.

6. I am sending separately a copy of U.N.R.W.A.'s latest report and copies of a popular pamphlet on the refugees.

(Henry Knight.)

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

(AC 246)

Original final copy forwarded to Sir Steuart

c/o British Legation,

BEIRUT.

9th September, 1952.

I must apologize for not having written sooner, as I had intended when I talked about Arab Refugees on the telephone before I left London. But since getting back to Beirut a fortnight ago there has been a great deal to discuss with my colleagues and also I have had to visit Damascus and Amman.

2. You very kindly asked me to suggest the best way of helping the 900,000 or so Arab Refugees from Palestine. I have been thinking this over and I believe that the most urgent need is to keep the plight of these people and the responsibility of the U.N., the U.S.A. and the U.K. for it, before the knowledge and the conscience of the public in USA. and UK.

3. I believe that this public does not really appreciate the Arab Refugee problem, and tends to think of a number of Moslem nomads living in goat-hair tents to whom it is no real hardship to move elsewhere, or to make room for the Jewish victims of Nazi and other persecution, especially when the public is told that the Jewish immigrants will use the Holy Land far more efficiently than the Arabs.

4. The public does not realise that not more than 5 per cent, if that, of the refugees are nomads, that most of the nearly one million now homeless were decent, self-respecting small farmers, that a number are as highly-educated and cultivated gentlefolk and professional people as ourselves, that a large number (I believe about 60,000) of the refugees are, like ourselves, Christians, and that the policy of U.N., U.S.A. and U.K. in the past is largely responsible for the refugees' present homeless and hopeless situation.

5. My fear is that unless these facts can somehow be brought home to the voters in the U.K. and the U.S.A., we shall before long find that the Governments, which now provide funds for the refugees, will cease to do so and that the refugees will either starve or turn to some other power for assistance.

6. It is impossible to reinstal the refugees in Palestine, and the Arab States in whose territories the Arab Refugees now are seem intent, not on helping the refugees to start life afresh, but on using their misfortunes as a means of vilifying the United Nations, blackmailing the Western Powers and preventing settlement of the Arab/Israeli question.

7. Unless world public opinion can be aroused sufficiently to make the Arab States co-operate with the Western Powers in their settlement (even without prejudice to the refugee's claim to eventual return to his home), I see no hope for them. How best to arouse the civilised conscience in the face of human inertia and opposing propaganda, I confess that I do not know, but somehow it must be done if one is to keep one's faith in human nature.

8. That the Arabs, including the Arab Refugees, Christian and Moslem alike, are an impractical people, I entirely agree; but

/in

Lady Astor,

but in view of past history I feel that the United Nations, the U.S.A. and the U.K. are morally bound to do what they can to repair their past errors. If the Refugees and the Arab States continue to refuse reasonable offers of help, then we might be released from the moral obligation. Whether we could then dissociate ourselves from the political problem of a million starving displaced persons in the Near East, is a different matter.

9. Forgive this long diatribe, but two-and-a-half years on this job have not reconciled me to the condition of the Arab Refugees, 300,000 of them in camps, and 600,000 in villages and towns, without homes or hope.

10. As for immediate and practical help, I think that probably clothes for everyone, educational help either for books, writing materials, etc., for primary schools or scholarships for bright pupils, or special medical help, for instance, tubercular refugees, would be most useful. Our relief funds do not run beyond the barest necessities. The Red Cross has done much to help by collecting gifts of clothing.

11. I am sending separately a copy of UNRWA's last report and copies of a popular pamphlet on the refugees. As I am a Government servant and as this letter expresses my own views, I am sending it via the Foreign Office so if it reaches you, you will realise that the Foreign Office have no objection to my passing on my personal ideas.

(H.F. KNIGHT)

1952

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E 7824/50

FROM

Sir H. Knight
Beirut
to Miss Waterlow

No.

Dated AC 246

Received in Registry— 10.9.52.
6.10.52.

Arab Refugees.

Encloses six copies of the UNRWA pamphlet & a copy of the last report for transmission to Lady Astor.

References

-/49

MINUTES

Pamphlets sent: EW 6/10.

(Print)

(How disposed of)

Sir H. Knight, Beirut
for Mr Richmond
19 Sept.

(Action completed) 8/10

(Index) 10/10

42863

(246)

UNCLASSIFIED

United Kingdom Delegation
Advisory Commission UNRWA
BEIRUT
c/o British Legation,
BEIRUT.

10th September, 1952.

E 1824/50

Dear Miss Waterlow,

With reference to Lady Astor's offer to help regarding the Arab Refugees, I should be grateful if the enclosed six copies of the UNRWA pamphlet and the copy of our last report might be sent on to her with my compliments.

2. I am sending the letter which I should like to write to her for M.E.S. approval and, if approved, sent to her.

Yours sincerely,

(H.F. KNIGHT)

Miss C.M. Waterlow, M.B.E.,
Middle East Secretariat,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

RECEIVED IN O.B.
6 - OCT 1952
3/10

SECRET.

Middle East Secretariat,
FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W. 1.
19th September 1952.

Thank you for your letter AC 246 of the 9th September, in which you enclosed a copy of a letter you were proposing to send to Lady Astor.

2. I have consulted Eastern Department about the terms of this letter and, we have agreed that we should prefer your letter to be toned down a little. I am therefore returning your letter together with a draft which we consider would be less compromising than yours.

3. I quite agree about the importance of keeping this problem before the British and American public and I am keenly aware of the danger that funds for relief to refugees may dry up, but I am by no means sure about the wisdom of inviting Lady Astor, as your original letter implicitly did, to stimulate publicity on this subject. I hope, therefore, that you will agree to send something on the lines of the draft I am enclosing.

Sir Henry Knight,
K.C.S.I., C.I.E.,
c/o British Legation,
Beirut.

(J.C.B.Richmond.)

D R A F T.

c/o British Legation,
BEIRUT.

September, 1952.

I must apologise for not having written sooner as I had intended when I talked about Arab refugees on the telephone before I left London. But since getting back to Beirut a fortnight ago I have had a great deal to discuss with my colleagues and also I have had to visit Damascus and Amman.

As you probably know, U.N.R.W.A. was set up by the United Nations in December 1949 to "carry out relief and works programmes" and to "consult with the interested Middle East Governments about measures they could take to prepare for the time when international assistance is no longer available. Because they proved so costly and because they did not more than temporarily diminish the number of refugees in need of relief, the works programmes were later abandoned, but under the so-called New Programme, approved by the General Assembly early this year, U.N.R.W.A. seeks to concentrate on resettlement of the refugees whose rights to return to their original homes, or to compensation, are formally reserved. The intention behind this programme is to enable relief expenditure to be progressively diminished as resettlement proceeds.

The difficulties in the way of this programme are, however, most formidable, and practically no resettlement has been achieved. The distribution of the refugees between the territories of Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and the Egyptian-administered Gaza Strip is most unfavourable to resettlement. Syria is virtually the only one of these countries where substantial

/resettlement .....

The Viscountess Astor, C.H.,
35, Hill Street,
Mayfair,
LONDON, W. 1.

resettlement possibilities exist and there are fewer refugees in Syria than in any of the other territories mentioned. In the tiny area of the Gaza Strip, where there is no possibility of resettlement at all, more than 200,000 refugees are crowded. Political factors also militate against resettlement. The Middle East Governments have to pay regard to public opinion in their own countries and this opinion continues to demand the impossible - that the refugees should return to their original homes - and look on their resettlement elsewhere as a further surrender to Israel. U.N.R.W.A.'s efforts to consult with Middle East Governments in preparation for the time when international assistance is no longer available have therefore been met with great caution and much evasion. Although the recent Arab League meeting has given signs of a more positive attitude towards resettlement by the Arab Governments, there is still reason to fear that Western funds will dry up before substantial resettlement has taken place and that the refugees will then either starve or turn to violent courses.

The human aspect of the problem is heartrending. Few people realise that most of the nearly one-million refugees now homeless were decent, self-respecting small farmers, that a number of them are highly educated and cultivated people, and that a large number - some 60,000, I believe - are Christians.

You were kind enough to ask me to suggest some way of helping these refugees. I think the most useful, immediate and practical help would be the supply of clothing for everyone ; educational help in the form of books, writing materials, etc., for primary schools, or special medical help for, for instance, tubercular refugees. Our relief funds do not run beyond the barest necessities though the Red Cross has done much to help by collecting gifts of clothing.

I am sending separately a copy of U.N.R.W.A.'s latest report and copies of a popular pamphlet on the refugees.

(Henry Knight.)

1952

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E 1824/51

FROM

Sir H. Knight
Beirut
To Mr Richmond

No. A.C. 246.

Dated 27.~~9~~.52

Received in Registry— 6.10.52

Arab Refugees.

He has sent modified ~~draft~~ letter to Lady Astor.

References

-/50

MINUTES

Ans 6/10.

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Action completed)	(Index)
8/10	10/10

Enter-

United Kingdom Delegation
Advisory Commission UNRWA
BEIRUT
c/o British Legation,
BEIRUT.

E

(AC 246)

UNCLASSIFIED

27th September, 1952.

E 1824/49

Mr. Jenkins 4/10

Dear Richmond,

Thank you for your letter of the 19th September about the draft for Lady Astor.

2. I have modified the draft you sent me a little but enclose a copy. As the alteration is so small, I am sending the letter to Lady Astor.

3. I am extremely glad I got your advice before I sent the other draft.

Yours sincerely,

(H.F. KNIGHT)

J.C.B. Richmond, Esq.,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

RECEIVED IN C.R.
6 - OCT 1952
STATE DEPT.

(AC 246)

c/o British Legation,

BEIRUT.

27th September, 1952.

I must apologize for not having written sooner as I had intended when I talked about Arab Refugees on the telephone before I left London. But since getting back to Beirut a month ago I have had a great deal to discuss with my colleagues besides visiting Damascus and Amman.

2. As you probably know, U.N.R.W.A. was set up by the United Nations in December 1949 to "carry out relief and works programmes" and to "consult with the interested Middle East Governments about measures they could take to prepare for the time when international assistance is no longer available." Because they proved so costly and because they did not more than temporarily diminish the number of refugees in need of relief, the "works programmes" were later abandoned, but under the so-called New Programme, approved by the General Assembly early this year, U.N.R.W.A. seeks to concentrate on providing opportunity for refugees to earn their own livelihood as farmers, tenants, labourers, traders, artisans, etc., etc., while their rights to return to their original homes, or to compensation, are formally reserved. The intention behind this programme is to enable relief expenditure to be progressively diminished as the refugees get occupations.

3. The difficulties in the way of this programme are, however, most formidable, and practically no reintegration has been achieved. The distribution of the refugees between the territories of Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and the Egyptian-administered Gaza Strip is most unfavourable. Syria ia virtually the only one of these countries where substantial areas of land, available for cultivation, exist, and there are fewer refugees in Syria than in any of the other territories mentioned. In the tiny area of the Gaza Strip, where there is no possibility of getting work of any kind, more than 200,000 refugees are crowded. Political factors also militate against our efforts to help the refugees. The Middle East Governments have to pay regard to public opinion in their own countries and this opinion continues to demand the impossible - that the refugees should return to their original homes - and looks on their resettlement elsewhere as a further surrender to Israel. U.N.R.W.A.'s consultations with Middle East Governments in preparation for the time when international assistance is no longer available have therefore been met with great caution and much evasion. Although the recent Arab League meeting is said to have given signs of a more positive attitude towards resettlement by the Arab Governments, there is still reason to fear that Western funds will dry up before substantial resettlement has taken place and that the refugees will then either starve or turn to violent courses.

4. The human aspect of the problem of course is heartrending. Few people seem to realise that most of the nearly one-million refugees now homeless were decent, self-respecting small farmers, that a number of them are highly-educated and cultivated people, and that some 60,000 of the refugees are Christians.

/5.

The Viscountess Astor, C.H.,
35 Hill Street,
Mayfair,
London, W.1.

5. You were kind enough to ask me to suggest some way of helping these refugees. I think the most useful, immediate and practical help would be the supply of clothing for everyone; educational help in the form of books, writing materials, etc., for primary schools; special medical help for, for instance, tubercular or other refugees, expensive or long-term treatment. Our relief funds do not run beyond the barest necessities, though the Red Cross has done much to help by collecting gifts of clothing.

6. I am sending separately a copy of U.N.R.W.A.'s latest report and copies of a popular pamphlet on the refugees.

Yours sincerely,

(H.F. KNIGHT)

1952

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E E 1824/52

FROM

Mr Campbell
Colonial Office
To Mr Duff.

No.

Dated 6.10.52.

Received in Registry— 10.10.52

Arab Refugees.

Encloses ~~cop~~ correspondence between Sir Robert Brooke-Popham and Mr Hopkinson, M/State for Colonial Affairs.

References

(Print)

(How disposed of)

Dft Sir R. Brooke-Popham
for Mr Nutting
15 Oct.

(Action completed) 18/10

(Index) 24/11

MINUTES

JWBN 17/10

See with.

A/ Sir R. Brooke-Popham ~~to~~ Mr Nutting
of 19.10.52

JWBN 21/10

42863

6th October, 1952.

EE1824/52

Dear Duff

Please see the enclosed correspondence between Mr. Hopkinson, Minister of State for Colonial Affairs, and Sir Robert Brooke-Popham. Could you please take over?

Yours sincerely,

A Campbell

(A. Campbell)
Private Secretary.

Eastern Dept. for draft reply from Mr. Nutting to Sir R. Brooke-Popham.

A. A. Duff 7:10

A. A. Duff, Esq., D.S.O., D.S.C.

6th October, 1952.

Thank you for your letter about Arab refugees driven out of Palestine. I have passed this on to Selwyn Lloyd in the Foreign Office, whose concern it is, and I have no doubt that he will be writing to you about it.

(Sgd.) Henry Hopkinson.

Air Chief Marshal
Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, G.C.V.O.,
K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., A.F.C.

From
Sir Robert Brooke-Popham
COTTISFORD,
BRACKLEY,
NORTHANTS.
TELEPHONE, FINMERE 247.

Dear Henry

This concerns the Arab refugees driven out of Palestine. I know it isn't your job but as we worked together in 1936, not entirely without success, I'm hoping you'll be able to pass it on to the right quarter.

The burden of my letter is that the settlement of these refugees ought to be recognised as being the job of the other Arab states. The three Eastern ones are rich beyond their wildest dreams, owing to oil. Iraq is certainly in need of more man-power, Saudi Arabia possibly. Koweit is't at present but I believe doesn't know what to do with her new wealth. I spent two years in Iraq as A.O.C. and occasionally

as acting High Commissioner. I expect the country wants more labour now for the irrigation scheme and when that begins to fructify, it will not only want a big increase in population to cultivate the land, but unless it does get this increase the canals and water channels will silt up as they did after the Mongol invasions. I'm told that Nuri is of this opinion. Doubtless many people know this, but to the outsider nothing seems to be happening. I could amplify this letter if required

Yrs sincerely

R Brooke-Popham

Registry No. E E1824/52

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Open.

C.
W.

Draft.

Air Chief Marshal
Sir Robert Brooke-
Popham, G.C.V.O.,
K.C.B., ~~C.B.~~,
C.M.G., D.S.O.,
A.F.C.

Cottisford,
Brackley,
North Hants.

FROM:

The Parliamentary
Under-Secretary
of State.
(Mr Nutting)

RECEIVED IN DIVISION
10 OCT 1952
SENT TO TYPE
DESPATCHED

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

October, 1952.

Henry Hopkinson has forwarded to me your letter about the Arab refugees.

I agree with you that the obvious and practical solution to the Arab refugee problem would be for the Arab states where development possibilities exist - that is Syria and Iraq - to accept the refugees for resettlement, and for the Arab states who are earning immense surplus revenues from oil - Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq - to finance the operation. But unfortunately such practical logic does not prevail with Arab minds. The Arab states consider that the United Nations, and particularly the Americans and ourselves, having brought Israel into existence, are responsible for the refugee problem. When, at the General Assembly of 1948-9, the United Nations undertook responsibility for the immediate relief of the refugees, the Arab Governments accepted this as a right to which they were entitled. At the same time they insisted, and have repeated this insistence at all subsequent meetings of the General Assembly, on the formal recognition of the refugees' rights to repatriation or compensation. (The cost of compensation, which the Palestinian Conciliation Commission has now worked out in detail, is likely to be well over their provisional estimates of £120,~~000,000~~ million, and, since ~~Syria~~ Israel cannot afford to pay more than a token sum,

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

(10/48) (22601) Wt. 8471-188 200m 6/49 G.S.St.

the prospects of meeting Arab demands ~~on this matter~~ are not bright.) It was not until the General Assembly meeting of 1950-51 that the Arab Governments agreed to accept the principle of resettlement as an alternative to repatriation. The General Assembly of 1951-52 subsequently endorsed an ambitious three-year resettlement programme estimated to cost $200 million, in addition to the cost of relief. Both the United States Government and we have contributed to this programme on a generous scale. Progress has, however, been disappointingly slow, owing to the reluctance of the Arab states where development possibilities exist to co-operate in a practical way. The Syrian Government are discussing ~~the~~ a programme for the resettlement of the 80,000 refugees in Syria but are not yet prepared to commit themselves to the acceptance of refugees, ~~or~~ from elsewhere. Nuri Pasha, when Prime Minister of Iraq, indicated that he would allow Arab refugee skilled labour into the country ~~in connection with~~ to work on the Government's large-scale development programme; and we hope that, when a substantial demand for unskilled labour for this programme arises, as it probably will within a year or two, the Iraq Government will not refuse entry to unskilled refugees. At present, however, there is little prospect of the Iraq Government agreeing, as a matter of policy, to the permanent resettlement of refugees in the country.

We are doing/

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

We are doing all we can, both by direct influence with the Arab States and Israel and through our Representative on the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, for the Arab refugees ~~to promote a solution of this tragic and difficult problem.~~ One of the main difficulties is the absence of effective means of compelling the Arab Governments to co-operate more fully with the Agency's efforts to settle the refugees and to make them self-supporting. The only sanction is to cut off rations, but this would not necessarily be effective and the result might only be to produce a chaotic situation in Jordan, where the bulk of the refugees are. Our special interests ~~now~~ there might then compel us to shoulder the burden of relief ourselves. There does not seem to be any short cut and we therefore continue working for a solution through the United Nations.

The important question of making use of the surplus revenues of the oil-producing Arab States is necessarily a separate one from that of the Arab refugees at present. It is, however, ~~an important question which is~~ very much in our minds and we hope that some way will be found to use these revenues for the development of the Middle East as a whole.

JA 9/10

(A. Nutting.)

(Sgd) ANTHONY NUTTING

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

(35941) Wt.17563/163 50,000 6/48 A.& E.W.Ltd. Gp.685
(36841) Wt.31782/171 85,000 11/48 " - "

FOREIGN OFFICE,
S.W.1.

(EE 1824/52) 15th October, 1952.

PRIVATE

Henry Hopkinson has forwarded to me your letter about the Arab refugees.

I agree with you that the obvious and practical solution to the Arab refugee problem would be for the Arab states where development possibilities exist - that is Syria and Iraq - to accept the refugees for resettlement, and for the Arab states who are earning immense surplus revenues from oil - Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq - to finance the operation. But unfortunately such practical logic does not prevail with Arab minds. The Arab states consider that the United Nations, and particularly the Americans and ourselves, having brought Israel into existence, are responsible for the refugee problem. When, at the General Assembly of 1948-9, the United Nations undertook responsibility for the immediate relief of the refugees, the Arab Governments accepted this as a right to which they were entitled. At the same time they insisted, and have repeated this insistence at all subsequent meetings of the General Assembly, on the formal recognition of the refugees' rights to repatriation or compensation. (The cost of compensation, which the Palestinian Conciliation Commission is now working out in detail, is likely to be well over their provisional estimates of £120 million, and, since Israel cannot afford to pay more than a token sum, the prospects of meeting Arab demands are not bright.) It was not until the General Assembly meeting of 1950-51 that the Arab Governments agreed to accept the principle of resettlement as an alternative to repatriation. The General Assembly of 1951-52 subsequently endorsed an ambitious three-year resettlement

/programme

Air Chief Marshal
Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, G.C.V.O., K.C.B.,
Cottisford,
Brackley,
North Hants.

programme estimated to cost £200 million, in addition to the cost of relief. Both the United States Government and we have contributed to this programme on a generous scale. Progress has, however, been disappointingly slow, owing to the reluctance of the Arab states where development possibilities exist to co-operate in a practical way. The Syrian Government are discussing a programme for the resettlement of the 80,000 refugees in Syria but are not yet prepared to commit themselves to the acceptance of refugees from elsewhere. Nuri Pasha, when Prime Minister of Iraq, indicated that he would allow Arab refugee skilled labour into the country to work on the Government's large-scale development programme; and we hope that, when a substantial demand for unskilled labour for this programme arises, as it probably will within a year or two, the Iraq Government will not refuse entry to unskilled refugees. At present, however, there is little prospect of the Iraq Government agreeing, as a matter of policy, to the permanent resettlement of refugees in the country.

We are doing all we can for the Arab refugees, both by direct influence with the Arab States and Israel and through our Representative on the United Nations Relief and Works Agency. One of the main difficulties is the absence of effective means of compelling the Arab Governments to co-operate more fully with the Agency's efforts to settle the refugees and to make them self-supporting. The only sanction is to cut off rations, but this would not necessarily be effective and the result might only be to produce a chaotic situation in Jordan, where the bulk of the refugees are. Our special interests there might then compel us to shoulder the burden of relief ourselves. There does not seem to be any short cut and we therefore continue working for a solution through the United Nations.

The important question of making use of the surplus revenues of the oil-producing Arab States is necessarily a separate one from that of the Arab refugees at present. It is, however, very much in our minds and we hope that some way will be found to use these revenues for the development of the Middle East as a whole.

(Sgd) ANTHONY NUTTING

(Parliamentary Under-Secretary)

1. Mr. Killick JA 20/10
2 Eastern Dept.

COTTISFORD,
BRACKLEY,
NORTHANTS.
TELEPHONE, FINMERE 247.

19th Oct

JN.

MES

EE 1824/52

Dear Hutting

Thank you very much for your letter EE 1824/52 of 15th October. It was very good of you to give me such a full account of what is being done.

I hope the present meeting of the General Assembly will be able to push things forward

Yrs sincerely

A Brooke-Popham

1952

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E E 1824/53.

FROM

U.K. Del. to U.N. New York.

to. U.K. Secretariat

No.

Dated 1044/41/52P

Received in Registry— 10.10.52 14.10.52

Arab Refugees.

Comments on letter to the "Daily Telegraph" of 15th September from the Press Attache to the Israel Delegation concerning compensation for Arab property in Israel.

References

EE 1824/46.

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Action completed) 3/11

(Index) 24/11

MINUTES

Perhaps News Dept. could pass on the gist of this letter to the Israel: Press Attaché?

E Watertown 15/10

E Dept (Mr Pullar)
News Dept.

E. Dept will wish to comment on this suggestion.

J.W.B. Richmond 16/10

I think the above suggestion makes the action rather too official, since Mr Arnon wrote a letter which was not especially for the eyes of H.M.G. I suggest that the opportunity might be taken of mentioning the matter casually to a member of the Israel Embassy in the course of some conversation. Mr Arnon could equally obtain the facts from his delegation in New York; a new P.C.C. release has now appeared giving details of the recent financial developments.

H.M. Pullar 16/10.

Agree with Mr. Pullar, ~~[illegible]~~

[illegible] 2/10

42863

The Jordan Minister has now replied to Arnon in the Times.

J.W.B. 30/10

UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
NEW YORK

No. 1077/71/52P.

CONFIDENTIAL ---- AIR BAG.

10 October 1952.

EE1824/52

Dear Secretariat,

Thank you for your letter No. EE.1824/46 of the 2nd October asking for our comments on a letter to the Daily Telegraph of the 15th September from the Press Attaché to the Israel Delegation.

2. The reference in the letter to compensation for Arab property in Israel is certainly misleading. The true position is that a global estimate of the value of this Arab property has already been made. This estimate (as mentioned in last year's Palestine Conciliation Commission Report) is about £100,000,000. You are correct in understanding that Berncastle is now engaged in the task of assessing individual claims. The P.C.C. have always held that the Israeli Government is responsible to individuals for their losses and that compensation money should not be paid into some central development or integration fund. The idea is that when the money is made available, individual claimants should put in their claims and these would be checked against the list which Berncastle is at present preparing. In the likely event that the total of all approved individual claims exceeds the total value of the global estimate, they would be scaled down proportionately.

3. Arnon's letter further gives the impression that the P.C.C. is trying to reach agreement with the Israeli Government on a sum which would be only a proportion of the global estimate. In fact the P.C.C. have never questioned the principle that Israel is liable for the full compensation of all claims.

4. We are sending copies of this letter to Sir Henry Knight at Beirut and Chanceries at Tel Aviv and Washington.

Yours ever,

DELEGATION.

Middle East Secretariat,
Foreign Office,
London, S. W. 1.

RECEIVED IN C.B.
14 OCT 1952
15. 10. 52
DEPT.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

Group ..... FO .....

Class ..... 371 .....

Piece ..... 98506 .....

Following document(s) retained in the

Department of origin under Section 3 (4)

of the Public Records Act, 1958

EE. 1824/54

Jersey

16/4/82.

IN PLACE

19/7/07

1 '52

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E E 1824/54

FROM

Mr Roper, M.P.

~~to~~ Mr Nutting.

No.

Dated 10.10.52

Received in Registry— 20.10.52

Arab Refugees.

Requests comments on a critical article in October's "Intelligence Digest"

References

(Print)

(How disposed of)

Dft Con H. Roper for Mr Nutting 27 Oct.

(Action completed) 3/11

(Index) 4/11

MINUTES

30/10

42863

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

Minutes.

I have not been able to find a copy of the "Intelligence Digest" referred to by Mr Roper. News Dept tell me that this is the production of Kenneth de Courcy and that the F.U. does not subscribe. It is not available to non-subscribers.

I ~~submit~~ submit a dft reply.

J.W.B. Richmond
13/10

Mr Killick first

Security Dept

Do you perhaps see copies? — it would be better if ~~we~~ we could see the article before writing.

John Killick
13/10

I'm afraid we don't though we sometimes borrow a copy from Mr Reilly's friends. Perhaps the best method wd be for P.U.S.D to borrow a copy?

J.P. Waterfield
15. X

I The

(30276) G.S.St.

Minutes.

The friends only have one copy. The October number is at present circulating round the office and I'm afraid is virtually impossible to get hold of.

B. Blundell
17/10

Sorry to have caused all this trouble!

Joan Hillick
20/10

M. E. Sec.
[illegible] 20/10

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

M. E. Secretariat
Ack 11/10

HOUSE OF COMMONS
HONI SOIT QUI MAL Y PENSE

10th October 1952. 11/10

E E1824/54

Dear Nutting,

Prompted perhaps by the critical article in this month's "Intelligence Digest", a questioner asked me what the Government's policy was with regard to the Arab refugees in the Middle East.

I replied that the matter was being dealt with by the United Nations, and I have since looked up the replies you gave to questions in the House on the 25th June last.

I should however be grateful for your comment, with particular reference to the item in the "Intelligence Digest".

Yours sincerely

Harold Roper

Anthony Nutting Esq. M.P.
Foreign Office.

Foreign Office,
S.W.1.

(EE 1824/54)

21st October, 1952.

We should make it clear how much we have done financially etc. This sort of nothing about us.

Dear Roper.

Thank you for your letter of the 10th October asking about our policy on the Arab refugees problem in the Middle East.

The Foreign Office does not get copies of Kenneth de Courcy's "Intelligence Digest", which, as you know, is only available to subscribers. If you care to send me a copy of the article to which you refer, I should be glad to comment on it. Meanwhile here is an outline of our policy on the refugee question.

These refugees, who number more than 860,000, are distributed unevenly over the Arab countries surrounding Israel; more than half of them are in Jordan. There is no possibility of Israeli agreement to their repatriation since their homes and lands in Israel are already occupied by Israelis. The interests of the refugees themselves would, in our view, best be served by resettlement in the neighbouring Arab States and Her Majesty's Government have therefore consistently urged in the United Nations the adoption of a practical and realistic resettlement policy, while reserving the right of the refugees (which has been confirmed by the United Nations) to eventual return to their homes or to compensation for the loss of their property. Two major obstacles, however, have so far hindered the successful resettlement of the refugees. The Arab States have opposed resettlement on the grounds that the only acceptable solution was the return of the refugees to their

/former

Sir Harold Roper, C.B.E., M.C., M.P.,
House of Commons.

former homes. It was not until the 1950-51 Session of the General Assembly that it proved possible to obtain the agreement of the Arab Governments to the extension of the scope of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for the Palestine Refugees (which up till then had provided direct relief and short-term work projects) to cover projects for the resettlement of the refugees in Arab countries. The second major obstacle has been the difficulty of obtaining finance. Up till the General Assembly Session last year funds had only been provided on a yearly basis. In the 1951-52 Session, however, the Assembly approved a three-year programme for the expenditure of $250.m. over a period of three years. $200.m. of this were intended for resettlement and $50.m. for relief. The object of this programme is to make the refugees self-supporting as soon as possible by providing them with homes and work. The first year of this programme has proved disappointing and it now appears most doubtful whether the refugees can be substantially resettled during the three-year period which ends in June, 1954. In spite of setbacks, however, there is no prospect of resolving this problem except by settling the refugees in the Arab countries and we therefore continue to support the principles embodied in the three-year programme. We hope that these principles will be endorsed at the forthcoming Session of the General Assembly and that the Agency will be authorised to continue the three-year programme with such modifications as are made necessary by the slow start which has been made.

Yours ever.

Rupert Hunting

(Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State)

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Wt. 11647 234 250m 7 51 V.P.Co. 51-8078

Registry
No. EE 1824/54.

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Open.

Draft.

Harold Roper, CBE, MC
M.P.,
House of Commons,
S.W. 1.

FROM :
Mr Nutting.

MJ
24/10

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W. 1.

OUTFILE
+ OC

27th October, 1952.

Thank you for your letter of the 10th October asking about our policy on the Arab refugees problem in the Middle East.

The Foreign Office does not get copies of Kenneth de Courcy's "Intelligence Digest", which, as you know, is only available to subscribers. If you care to send me a copy of the article to which you refer, I should be glad to comment on it. Meanwhile here is an outline of our policy on the refugee question.

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/refugees to .....

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/We have played .....

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

We have played our full part in assisting the refugees. In the first period after the Palestine war, from the 1st December, 1948, to the 30th April, 1950, during which the refugees were looked after by the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees, His Majesty's Government contributed a total of £1,100,000. to the funds of this Organization. Since the 1st May, 1950, when responsibility for the refugees was taken over by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, we have contributed, or contracted to contribute, a total of £6,666,726. In addition, during the whole period we have given two m. interest-free loans of £1½m. each to Jordan. These loans are being spent to develop her economy and will thus assist her to absorb the refugees, of whom about 460,000 are in Jordan.

(Sgd) ANTHONY NUTTING

M.J.
24/10
Parliamentary Under Secretary.
~~(A. Nutting.)~~

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

OUTFILE

FOREIGN OFFICE,
S.W.1.

27th October, 1952.

(EE 1824/54)

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/the

Sir Harold Roper, C.B.E., M.C., M.P.,
House of Commons.

the only acceptable solution was the return of the refugees to their former homes. It was not until the 1950-51 Session of the General Assembly that it proved possible to obtain the agreement of the Arab Governments to the extension of the scope of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for the Palestine Refugees (which up till then had provided direct relief and short-term work projects) to cover projects for the resettlement of the refugees in Arab countries. The second major obstacle has been the difficulty of obtaining finance. Up till the General Assembly Session last year funds had only been provided on a yearly basis. In the 1951-52 Session, however, the Assembly approved a three-year programme for the expenditure of $250 million over a period of three years. $200 million of this were intended for resettlement and $50 million for relief. The object of this programme is to make the refugees self-supporting as soon as possible by providing them with homes and work. The first year of this programme has proved disappointing and it now appears most doubtful whether the refugees can be substantially resettled during the three-year period which ends in June, 1954. There is no prospect, however, of resolving this problem except by settling the refugees in the Arab countries and therefore, in spite of setbacks we continue to support the principles embodied in the three-year programme. We hope that these principles will be endorsed at the forthcoming Session of the General Assembly and that the Agency will be authorised to continue the three-year programme with such modifications as are made necessary by the slow start which has been made.

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/for

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(Sgd) ANTHONY NUTTING

(Parliamentary Under-Secretary)

1952

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E 1824/55

FROM

Mr H. Knight
Beirut
To Eng Bowker

No. AC.248.

Dated 15/10/52.

Received in Registry— 22/10/52

Mr P. Smithers visit to Beirut

Comments on (1) relief budget.
(2) TVA survey.
(3) Jordan's admission to
Ad. Com.

References

MINUTES

JWR 22/10

(Print)

(How disposed of)

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(Action completed)	(Index)
27/10	30/11

42863

United Kingdom Delegation
Advisory Commission UNRWA
BEIRUT

c/o British Embassy,

BEIRUT.

(AC 248)

CONFIDENTIAL

15th October, 1952.

E 1824/55

Dear Bowker,

Please refer to your letter (EE 1824/48) of the 3rd October referring to Mr. Peter Smithers' visit here.

2. My anxiety about the American attitude has been much relieved by the State Department having agreed to $23 million for relief for this year and $21 million for next year. But I am still a little disturbed by the T.V.A. "desk survey" and also by the hesitation which I gather unofficially the State Department feel about inviting Jordan to be on the Advisory Commission. I think probably my trouble is that Locke is somewhat uncertain of his own position and has not yet accustomed himself to the informal and sometimes somewhat free discussion of problems between members of the Advisory Commission which we have hitherto carried on. I hope, however, that my misgivings are quite unfounded.

3. I have no particular points of policy I want to put before the Minister of State before the General Assembly discussions. I had given my ideas to you before I left England, and nothing has since led me to change them to any significant degree.

Yours sincerely,

(H.F. Knight)

Sir R.J. Bowker, K.C.M.G.,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

P.S. It may amuse you that I have just received a correction to the Minutes of our meeting of the 25th September which expunges a reference Locke then made about leaving reintegration to bi-lateral arrangements! I suppose he has just caught up with the State Department's views!

RECEIVED IN A.S.B.
22 1952
d/22

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

Group ..... FO .....

Class ..... 371 .....

Piece ..... 98506 .....

Following document(s) retained in the

Department of origin under Section 3 (4)

of the Public Records Act, 1958

EE. 1824/56

Greesy

16/4/82.

IN PLACE

19/7/07

1952

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E E 1824/56

FROM

Sir H. Knight
Beirut
To Miss Waterlow

No. AC.201/1

Dated

Received in Registry— 18-10-52.
24-10-52

General Galloway.

Requests copy of the "Intelligence Summary" in which Gen. Galloway has written a rather injudicious article.

References

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Action completed)

(Index)

MINUTES

News Dept. ✓
P.U.S.D.

Is this de Courcy's publication? If so I believe it is unobtainable in the F.O.

J.B. Richmond
27/10

"De Courcy's publication is the "Intelligence DIGEST." I can find no publication called the Intelligence Summary. There seems to be no reason for supposing the article in question may have appeared in the Digest, which is not received by any one in the Foreign Office, but in case it did I asked the Library to ring up the Digest and find out. The Digest, which is, naturally, unhelpful, said they were too busy at the moment to look up their files. We cannot oblige them to do so.

42863

~~Mr Richmond~~
P.U.S.D.

J. Bourgoin
30/10

19

Attach two copies of an article from the October number of Kenneth de Courcy's "Intelligence Digest" which I think must be the one Mr Knight refers to.

B. Blundell
8/11

Mr Richmond.

Thank you. We now have this article from other sources.

JWBR
11/11

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN ON THIS PAGE.

Extract from "Intelligence Digest"

October, 1952.

"ARAB REFUGEES - ANOTHER CASE FOR ENQUIRY.

"The following facts about the refugee position in the Middle East suggest that a full enquiry is necessary.

"As a result of the Palestine war, there are just under one million refugees in Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq.

"The work of U.N.R.W.A.

"In November, 1948, the General Assembly of the United Nations voted 32 million dollars for a 9 months' relief programme to be controlled by the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees in cooperation with the International League of Red Cross Societies, the Swiss International Committee of the Red Cross, and the American Quakers. In due course, a new agency, U.N.R.W.A. was set up, which assumed responsibility in May, 1950.

"Much money has been spent, but, despite this, the great majority of these refugees are without work or homes, and 35 per cent of them still live in camps. The remainder exist as best they can. For the most part, they sit about idle, absorbing relief, and losing morale.

"They are increasing at the rate of about 12,000 a year, and, if U.N.R.W.A. and the governments of the Arab countries where these refugees have taken shelter are not more successful in the future than they have been in the past, the resettlement rate will do no more than keep pace with the population increase.

"Poor Direction.

"Part of the trouble is that the direction of U.N.R.W.A. has been poor. Mr. J.B. Blandford, Jr., the present Director, is a failure. This tough, healthy little man, of approaching 60, had some connection with the Tennessee Valley Scheme during the war. Afterwards, he held a post in Greece, and, according to him (but not to others) he guided the Greeks through most of their pre-war troubles.

"He has no experience whatever in dealing with Arab governments. He has the faculty of leaving a visitor without the faintest conception of what he is talking about.

"Mr. Blandford believes in centralisation, and deals direct with no less than 21 heads of departments or advisers. If, for example, it is necessary to move a milk orderly from one camp to another in Jordan, application must be made to Beirut on a form with six copies. This causes the utmost confusion. The Director trusts nobody; nobody trusts the Director.

"Unsuitable Appointments.

"The Foreign Offices of the great Powers have appointed a number of members to an Advisory Commission. Notable amongst these advisers, are those from Britain and Turkey. The British Adviser is nearly 70, and is an expert on India. The Turkish Adviser is over 80, and was a General in the first World War.

"Useless Conferences

"Once a month, representatives of all the countries which have refugees attend a conference in Beirut. This lasts two days, and is considered, by those who attend it, as a pleasant change at the seaside.

"The agenda is not circulated until representatives arrive, so they have not the slightest idea of what is to be discussed. The performance opens with a long-winded speech by the Director, followed by an exhaustive exhortation to unity and the achievement of some high purpose, and especially the avoidance of a colonial approach, which is supposed to be a dig at Britain. At noon, the meeting adjourns for refreshment, which is thoroughly enjoyed by all - no expense being spared. The session is then resumed, and drifts to a dreary close, generally with a series of resolutions to postpone taking any decisions at all.

"After two useless days, representatives go home wondering what it was all about, but still without a reply as to whether or not the local milk orderly can be transferred from one camp to another.

"Wasted Visits

"Between July, 1951, and March, 1952, the Director of this remarkable agency paid five visits to one country, involving a stay of one night on each occasion. He usually arrived in the evening, and left at noon on the following day.

"During these visits he never visited a single refugee camp.

"A Trip to Paris

"Last autumn, during the United Nations Assembly in Paris, the Director and members of the Advisory Commission went to submit a report. They took three months for this agreeable purpose. The object of the report was to acquire further large funds for refugee relief and settlement.

"An interest compromise, resulting from this delightful three months' visit to Paris, seemed to please the Director of the Administration, but has not solved, and will not solve the problem of these unhappy refugees.

"Urgent Need for Changes.

"First of all, U.N.R.W.A. must have a new and competent Director, who understands the Arabs, and has some idea of office administration and organisation. This agency needs a man who can decentralise, knows how to take decisions, and whom people trust.

"There will be no settlement of the major problems of the Middle East until this refugee problem is settled. If it is not settled, it will become a dangerous ulcer.

"The Issue facing the Arab Governments.

"There are a number of issues which the Arab Governments concerned do not want to face. Somehow or other, at least three-quarters of a million refugees have got to be made

self-supporting. There is not the slightest chance of these people being reabsorbed in Israel. They cannot be allowed to continue unsettled.

"The Arab governments must understand that international aid for these refugees cannot for ever continue, and it may be necessary to point out the areas where they can best be settled.

"If the difficulties are great, the first essential is to have the whole problem handled by men who understand the Middle East, and whome the Middle East understands; men who are at once resolute and trustworthy.

"A Disquieting Report.

"If anyone should think that this report be over-critical 'Intelligence Digest' should perhaps state that it comes from a ranking General, who has held extremely important appoints during and since the war, and who happens to be fully aware of all the facts of this case. His evidence should be heard by those ultimately resposible for this matter.

"The full report which he has sent us, together with his covering letter, is very disquieting. He says that he has seen the British Foreign Office about this matter, and the comment in his letter to us is this:-

"Our Foreign Office are the utter bottom; really the final END. They simply don't care. Unless the Americans steam up nothing will happen....."

"A Serious Accusation

This is a most serious accusation from a General of high rank, who has recently occupied positions of top importance."

United Kingdom Delegation
Advisory Commission UNRWA
BEIRUT

Enviro
JN. 24/10

(C 201/1)

UNCLASSIFIED

c/o British Embassy,

BEIRUT.

18th October, 1952.

E 7824/56

Dear Miss Waterlow,

I understand that our friend General Galloway has been shooting off his mouth in England in print in a publication called THE INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY, somewhat injudiciously.

2. I should be grateful if I might have a copy sent out as soon as possible. I cannot give you the date of the publication or verify that the article was by General Galloway because the only copy to reach me was given to Blandford as pleasant light reading on his trip to New York!!

3. I should imagine this is one of these subscription newsletters by which experts, and pseudo-experts, in foreign affairs flatter the British public, but I may be wrong.

Yours sincerely,

(H.F. Knight)

Miss C.M. Waterlow, M.B.E.,
Middle East Secretariat,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

RECEIVED IN C.B.
24 OCT 1952
SENT TO CIA
25/10

1952

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EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E E 1824/57

FROM

Mr R. Brooman-White M.P.

No.

Dated 20.10.52.

Received in Registry— 28.10.52

Arab Refugees.

He has talked to Sir H Knight about refugees. Discusses the part a P.O. or speech might play in going Israeli response.

References

(Print)

(How disposed of)

Dft) Mr. Brooman-White M.P. from Mr. Nutting 29/10.

(Action completed) 3/11

(Index) 4/11

MINUTES

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2. Lie - Acked. 23/10

1. Mr. Killick
2. Eastern Dept.

E 1824/57

20th October, 1952.

Dear Nutting,

During the last week of September I spent a few days in Syria and the Lebanon where I talked to some of the local politicians, as well as to Sir Henry Knight and others working on the refugee problem. (I understand Peter Smithers has also covered the same beat and has been in touch with you about it).

Though I realise that the only real hope turns on getting the Syrians to play a more effective role, I wonder whether a Question, or section of a speech, enquiring whether, as a contribution to a general settlement in the Middle East, on which her own future inevitably depends, Israel was considering, or would consider, any more active assistance to the Arab refugees, would assist or the reverse.

Any sort of Israeli response, however slight, obviously would be helpful at least in improving the general atmosphere and in mitigating some of the chronic Arab fears. On the other hand you may feel that such a point put by us might run the risk of increasing the Arab tendency to say that it is up to the Israeli to cope with the refugee problem, and thereby even further to slow down their own negligible efforts.

Please do not bother to reply to this letter unless you think there is anything constructive which I could do to help.

Yours sincerely,

R. Braman-White

Anthony Nutting, Esq., M.P.,
Foreign Office.

We have been asked whether a suggestion that Israel ought to do more for the Arab refugees should be raised in the House of Commons.

In favour of such a course is the argument that Israel has done very little towards relieving the plight of the refugees, and that a statement or question in the House of Commons might induce her to do more. Equally, implied or open criticism of Israel's stone-walling tactics would please the Arabs.

Against these arguments must be set the emphasis that is now placed on resettlement as opposed to repatriation of refugees, the negotiations which are being conducted with Syria, and her membership of the Advisory Committee of U.N.R.W.A. Criticism of Israel's part in providing a solution to the problem might lead the Arab States to decline further help in the expectation that pressure would be brought to bear on Israel. Also, Israel would not be influenced to change her attitude by publicity in the House. She has resisted pressure from all sides so far, has an enormous immigration problem of her own, and has always argued that the refugee problem should form part of a general settlement. In addition, Israel has agreed to provide some assistance by partial unblocking of Arab assets, and by participating in plans for compensation for expropriated Arab property. Lastly, the Arab States will probably raise the whole matter at the United Nations Assembly.

On balance, therefore, it is submitted that a Parliamentary Question or a Statement would, at the present juncture, have no effect in bringing Israel to a more co-operative frame of mind. Although Mr. Brooman-White does not insist on a reply, I think we should explain the situation.

H. M. Sullan
24/10.

Revised draft submitted.
Mr Richmond concurs.
25/10.

Mr Kilroy

Letter can now issue.
28/10

Registry
No.

~~Top Secret~~
~~Secret~~
~~Confidential~~
~~Restricted~~
Open.

Draft. letter to
Mr.R.Brooman-
White,M.P.

From:

Mr. Nutting

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Mr Killick

Covering memo. and this draft. cleared with M.E.S.

H. M. Sullivan. 24/10.

Thank you for your letter of the 20th October about the Palestinian refugees.

As you may well imagine this problem is under constant consideration, and we are interested in any course of action, or in any suggestion, which would help us to find a solution. Although a Parliamentary Question or statement would draw attention to the plight of the refugees and do something to publicise the attitude of both Israel and the Arab States, I doubt if it would be effective in producing a change of mind in the Israelis. They have resisted pressure from all sides for years to allow mass immigration of the refugees, they are engaged in the gigantic task of assimilating their own diverse immigrants, and they are taking steps towards some slight alleviation of the refugees' unhappy lot by a partial ~~relax~~ release of blocked Arab balances, and by assisting in an enquiry into the possibilities of paying compensation for Arab property. In addition, the Israel Government have consistently held that the refugee problem is only one aspect of a general settlement, which she has repeatedly invited the Arab States to arrange with her.

On the Arab side, a Parliamentary Question, which implies criticism of Israel's attitude, might encourage the Arab states to desist from going any further with schemes for resettlement, on the grounds that the Western Powers may bring pressure to bear on the Israelis, and thus support the Arab thesis that Israel should be compelled to take back at least half the refugees.

I am afraid this is rather a negative reply to your letter, but you well understand how delicate

/this

whole subject is, and we do not want to do anything which might embarrass U.N.R.W.A. in their work.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry No. EE7824/57

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~~Confidential.~~
~~Restricted.~~
Open.

Draft.

R. BROOMAN-WHITE

Mr Brooman-White

from

Mr Nutting.

~~MES~~ JWBR 25/10

Mr Killick / first

Counsel Wardrop 25/10.

RECEIVED IN DIVISION
28 OCT 1952
6.30 pm
SENT TO TYPE 29/10

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

(365) Wt. 25886/149 100m. 1/48 A.O.St.

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29/11

29/12

Thank you for your letter of 20th October. The problem of the Palestine refugees is very much in our minds and we welcome suggestions for solving it.

Your talks with Sir Henry Knight and others will, I am sure, have given you a clear picture of the ~~magnitude~~ size and nature of the difficulties still to be overcome; and I will therefore confine myself to dealing with what seem to me to be the salient points.

Past resolutions of the United Nations have endorsed the right of the refugees, should they so wish, to return to their homes in what is now Israel territory; and Israel has, in fact, readmitted a ~~certain~~ small number ~~of~~ so as ~~to~~ ~~enable to~~ reunite families which were split up during the Palestine war. Whether any very considerable proportion would, of their own volition, go back to become citizens of what is now an alien state is ~~at least~~ perhaps open to doubt; and so ~~also~~ certainly is the practicability of such an operation, more particularly in

in view of the large influx of Jews from all over the world into Israel. Israel herself, both on political and on economic grounds, would vehemently resist anything more than the return of a token number of Arabs.

The Arab States for their part have continued to demand the repatriation of the refugees to the areas from which they came, and also what would in effect mean detaching those areas from the State of Israel. This would, of course, also meet with the strongest resistance by the Israelis.

Our own view is that, while we would not wish to deny the right of repatriation, its implementation does seem to be fraught with great practical difficulties; and we feel sure that in practice resettlement in the Arab states offers better prospects both for the refugees themselves and for the peace and stability of the Middle East as a whole. The Arab states themselves now appear ready to consider ~~to adopting~~ that

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Confidential.
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Open.

Draft.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

(365) Wt. 25886/149 100m. 1/48 A.O.St.

some such resettlement; and we are anxious to avoid saying or doing anything that might discourage their nascent (NASCENT) interest.

Meanwhile Israel has made a conciliatory gesture in offering to release unconditionally the Arab bank balances she has hitherto blocked; and negotiations are now proceeding for the payment of a first instalment of £1 million. She is also discussing with the United Nations Palestine Conciliation Commission the very much bigger question of compensation to Arab refugees in lieu of their repatriation.

As you probably know, the annual report of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency is at this very moment being debated in the General Assembly, which will shortly also be ~~debating~~ considering other aspects of the Palestine problem. In the circumstances we should prefer to avoid having any Parliamentary discussion, at any rate for the time being. We are most anxious

that

that some progress should
be made over the refugees;
and the danger is that
any statement by H. M. Government
might be liable to [the kind of] misconstruction that would
~~discourage~~ [discourage] one or other party to
the dispute ~~and so discourage~~
~~either~~ from giving the
United Nations and its
Agencies the support they
so badly need ~~if~~ in
solving this problem.

JR
27/10

(Sgd) ANTHONY NUTTING

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

OUTFILE

FOREIGN OFFICE,
S.W.1.

(EE 1824/57)

29th October, 1952.

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/practicability

R. Brooman-White, Esq., M.P.,
House of Commons.

practicability of such an operation, more particularly in view of the large influx of Jews from all over the world into Israel. Israel herself, both on political and on economic grounds, would strenuously resist the return of anything more than a token number of Arabs.

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that some progress should be made over the refugees; and the danger is that any statement by Her Majesty's Government might be liable to the kind of misconstruction that would discourage one or other party to the dispute from giving the United Nations and its Agencies the support they so badly need in solving this problem.

(Sgd) ANTHONY NUTTING

(Parliamentary Under-Secretary)

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1952

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EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E E 1824/58

FROM
Sir H. Knight
Beirut
To Miss Waterlow

No. AC.201/1

Dated 28.10.52.

Received in Registry— 31.10.52.

Gen. Galloway.

Comments on the article from the "Intelligence Digest – a Review of World Affairs".

References

-/56

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Action completed) 18/11

(Index) 4/11

MINUTES

Have you got this article?

News Dept. ✓.

C Waterlow 3/11

No. It is not received by any one in the Foreign Office & cannot, I believe, be bought except by annual subscription.

John Bourgoin
News.

Middle East Secretariat 6/11

Library – can you help?

C Waterlow 6/11

Mr. Bourgoin, News Dept is collecting the copy from the publishers 7/11/52

C W Peace 7/11

This article is in sharp contrast to Galloway's own article in the Daily Telegraph (EE 1824/41) which makes an attempt at constructive criticism. This one merely abuses Blandford, sneers at Sir H. Knight & General Bele and ends with a scream of rage at the F.O. It does

/ not

42863

not deserve serious criticism. This may explain why Sir H. Roper has not sent us a copy as invited in Mr Nutting's letter of 27th Oct. (EE 1824/54)

I do not think any action is indicated.

J.W.B. Richmond
11/11

E. Dept. (Mr Wardrop)

Unfortunate though his article is, I cannot help feeling some sympathy with the criticism of Mr Blandford.

The attack on the Foreign Office is rather unexpected when compared with General Galloway's courtesy in thanking Sir W. Strang for his kindness (see his letter of 9th August at EE 18211/96.)

Sir J. Bowker may care to see.

James C. Wardrop
12/11

Sir W. Strang may care to see.

R. J. Bowker
12/xi

Mr. Nutting

W.S.
13/11

See within

A) Sir H. Knight, Beirut to Mr Richmond
AC 201/1 of 6/11

(Initialled)

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN ON THIS PAGE.

(AC 201/1)

UNCLASSIFIED

United Kingdom Delegation
Advisory Commission UNRWA
BEIRUT

c/o British Embassy,

BEIRUT.

28th October, 1952.

Enter JM.

EE 1824/58

Dear Miss Waterlow,

If you have not seen INTELLIGENCE DIGEST - A REVIEW OF WORLS AFFAIRS, 14th Year, No. 167, October 1952, I should try and do so. There is an article on page 18 "Arab Refugees - Another Case for Inquiry" which ends up by stating that the report comes from "a ranking General who has held extremely important appointments during, and since, the war, and who happens to be fully aware of all the facts of the case", and quotes from the General's letter: "Our Foreign Office are the utter bottom, really the final END; they simply don't care. Unless the Americans steam up, nothing will happen". ! !

Yours sincerely,

(H.F. Knight)

Miss C.M. Waterlow, M.B.E.,
Middle East Secretariat,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

RECEIVED in O.B.
31 OCT 1952

extend throughout the entire Soviet empire, are sometimes lost sight of because of the fanatical devotion of a minority, which gives the impression of a masterly overall leadership. It is easy to be over-impressed by what is certainly a remarkable performance on the part of this minority, and to lose sight of significant weaknesses, which may, in the end, prove decisive.

At any rate, this curious incident, even though it be without satisfactory explanation, is worth notice. Whatever the cause, it must have sprung from inefficiency, or dissension, or both.

THE ARCTIC ROUTE: STRATEGIC SVALBARD

THREE recent news items have received far less attention than they deserved. First, the reports of greatly increased Russian air activity in the Arctic. Second, Soviet pressure on the Scandinavian countries as the result of the NATO naval manœuvres—"Exercise Mainbrace." And, third, the Soviet declaration that the four Arctic seas of Kara, Laptev, Eastern Siberia, and Chukotsk are Soviet national territory over the entire Polar zone.

We have information of Russian activities in the Arctic from a direct and highly reliable source, which sets these happenings in a correct context.

A Far-reaching Strategic Plan

Russia has, in fact, set in motion a far-reaching strategic plan. It involves, in the first place, the following areas:

1. The north Siberian coast, including the estuaries of the rivers Ob, Yenissej, Lena, and Kolyma, and Cape Chelyushkin.
2. The four Arctic seas above mentioned.
3. The islands of Novaja Semlya, Severnaja Semlya, and Semlya Franzisa Josifa.[1]

Early in August, a large and strongly equipped expedition left Murmansk to establish a winter base on Ostrov Rudolph, the northernmost island of Semlya Franzisa Josifa.

Extensive Soviet Claims

From all these areas, extending far beyond coastal waters, the observer is barred. The strategic importance of these heavily guarded and far-reaching zones is evident. From bases within this area, Canada and the U.S.A. can be threatened and come within reach of both reconnaissance and attack.

This central Arctic area, reaching from Siberia to the North Pole, is claimed as exclusively Soviet territory.

There are also areas which are within the zone of Soviet interests and planning, but which are still recognised as theoretically free seas—the Barents Sea, and the Bering Sea in the Arctic area, impinging on NATO territory; and the Baltic, over which Russia is extremely sensitive, and on the coast of which important strategic developments are taking place.

The Svalbard Area

In this picture, a report on the island group of Svalbard (Spitzbergen), is of significance.

Up to the end of World War I, the islands of Spitzbergen were a no-man's-land. Their possible future strategic importance then came to be recognised. Lying about half-way on the direct route between Norway and the North Pole, it was realised that the development of air power would make these islands a vital stepping stone and base for trans-Arctic air communications.

As none of the three Powers—the Soviet Union, the British Empire, and the U.S.A.—was willing to see this territory pass into the possession of either of the other two, an international treaty was signed at Sèvres in 1920, granting possession of Spitzbergen to Norway, thenceforth to be called Svalbard.

[1] Franz Josef Land: on some maps Fridtjof Nansen Ld.

MISS WATERLOW
Eastern Dept. Room 133

To the island group of Svalbard p[illegible] was added the name of Bj[illegible]oya (Baeren Insel), located on the seaway towards the Scandinavian mainland.

Norwegian sovereignty, however, was limited. The establishment of fortifications, military or naval bases, and the stationing of troops were forbidden. All the treaty signatories were granted extensive rights for the acquisition of property and exploitation of resources.

Climatic Advantages

No other territory so near the North Pole is so open to navigation as Svalbard. A branch of the Gulf Stream influences the western, northern and eastern areas. The west coast has well protected fjords, open to navigation for nine months of the year.

These favourable climatic conditions make the surrounding waters rich in fur-bearing animals, birds, fish, and whales. These are important economic resources.

Mineral Wealth

Svalbard has also been found to possess mineral wealth ; coal, asbestos, marble, zinc, phosphorites, and magnesites.

Coal production has helped to involve Svalbard in international problems. The mines are exploited by two main companies: the Norwegian-Spitzbergen Coal Company, and a Soviet concern, the *Arktik Ugolj*. The Soviet Union has bought a large mining concession, important in connection with industrial and military bases in Karelia, the Kola Peninsula, and northern Siberia, all of which need coal in large quantities.

New Soviet Establishments

Entirely rebuilt after the destruction of World War II, the Soviet establishments are treated as top secret. Nothing is published about production. Local inhabitants speak of an increasing amount of Russian labour from the mainland. The present number of Russian workers is estimated at about 4,000.

It is thought that these workers are not used entirely for coal mining. Great building activity and an unusually large number of heavily-laden Soviet ships seem to point to other activities.

Strategic Bases

While Norway remains faithful to international agreements and has only a civil administration, it is feared that Russia has already made considerable headway in the establishment of something like military bases.

Norway fears that Soviet Russia might, at the appropriate time, take over Svalbard, and, thus, dominate the northern air routes.

ARAB REFUGEES—ANOTHER CASE FOR INQUIRY

THE following facts about the refugee position in the Middle East suggest that a full inquiry is necessary.

As a result of the Palestine war, there are just under one million refugees in Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq.

The Work of U.N.R.W.A.

In November, 1948, the General Assembly of the United Nations voted 32 million dollars for a 9 months' relief programme to be controlled by the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees in cooperation with the International League of Red Cross Societies, the Swiss International Committee of the Red Cross, and the American Quakers. In due course, a new agency, U.N.R.W.A.[1] was set up, which assumed responsibility in May, 1950.

Much money has been spent, but,

[1] United Nations Relief and Works Agency.

despite this the great majority of these refugees are without work or homes, and 35 per cent. of them still live in camps. The remainder exist as best they can. For the most part, they sit about idle, absorbing relief, and losing morale.

They are increasing at the rate of about 12,000 a year, and, if U.N.R.W.A. and the governments of the Arab countries where these refugees have taken shelter are not more successful in the future than they have been in the past, the resettlement rate will do no more than keep pace with the population increase.

Poor Direction

Part of the trouble is that the direction of U.N.R.W.A. has been poor. Mr. J. B. Blandford, Jr., the present Director, is a failure. This tough, healthy little man, of approaching 60, had some connection with the Tennessee Valley Scheme during the war. Afterwards, he held a post in Greece; and, according to him (but not to others), he guided the Greeks through most of their post-war troubles.

He has no experience whatever in dealing with Arab governments. He has the faculty of leaving a visitor without the faintest conception of what he is talking about.

Mr. Blandford believes in centralisation, and deals direct with no less than 21 heads of departments or advisers. If, for example, it is necessary to move a milk orderly from one camp to another in Jordan, application must be made to Beirut on a form with six copies. This causes the utmost confusion. The Director trusts nobody; nobody trusts the Director.

Unsuitable Appointments

The Foreign Offices of the great Powers have appointed a number of members to an Advisory Commission. Notable amongst these advisers, are those from Britain and Turkey. The British Adviser is nearly 70, and is an expert on India. The Turkish Adviser is over 80, and was a General in the first World War.

Useless Conferences

Once a month, representatives of all the countries which have refugees attend a conference in Beirut. This lasts two days, and is considered, by those who attend it, as a pleasant change at the seaside.

The agenda is not circulated until representatives arrive, so they have not the slightest idea of what is to be discussed. The performance opens with a long-winded speech by the Director, followed by an exhaustive exhortation to unity and the achievement of some high purpose, and especially the avoidance of a colonial approach, which is supposed to be a dig at Britain. At noon, the meeting adjourns for refreshment, which is thoroughly enjoyed by all—no expense being spared. The session is then resumed, and drifts to a dreary close, generally with a series of resolutions to postpone taking any decisions at all.

After two useless days, representatives go home wondering what it was all about, but still without a reply as to whether or not the local milk orderly can be transferred from one camp to another.

Wasted Visits

Between July, 1951, and March, 1952, the Director of this remarkable agency paid five visits to one country, involving a stay of one night on each occasion. He usually arrived in the evening, and left at noon on the following day.

During these visits he never visited a single refugee camp.

A Trip to Paris

Last autumn, during the United Nations Assembly in Paris, the Director and members of the Advisory Commission went to submit a report. They took three months for this agreeable purpose. The object of the report was to acquire further large funds for refugee relief and settlement.

An interesting compromise, resulting

from this delightful three months' visit to Paris, seemed to please the Director of the Administration, but has not solved, and will not solve, the problem of these unhappy refugees.

Urgent Need for Changes

First of all, U.N.R.W.A. must have a new and competent Director, who understands the Arabs, and has some idea of office administration and organisation. This agency needs a man who can decentralise, knows how to take decisions, and whom people trust.

There will be no settlement of the major problems of the Middle East until this refugee problem is settled. If it is not settled, it will become a dangerous ulcer.

The Issue Facing the Arab Governments

There are a number of issues which the Arab governments concerned do not want to face. Somehow or other, at least three-quarters of a million refugees have got to be made self-supporting. There is not the slightest chance of these people being reabsorbed in Israel. They cannot be allowed to continue unsettled.

The Arab governments must understand that international aid for these refugees cannot for ever continue, and it may be necessary to point out the areas where they can be settled.

If the difficulties are great, the first essential is to have the whole problem handled by men who understand the Middle East, and whom the Middle East understands; men who are at once resolute and trustworthy.

A Disquieting Report

If anyone should think that this report be over-critical, *Intelligence Digest* should perhaps state that it comes from a ranking General, who has held extremely important appointments during and since the war, and who happens to be fully aware of all the facts of this case. His evidence should be heard by those ultimately responsible for this matter.

The full report which he has sent us, together with his covering letter, is very disquieting. He says that he has seen the British Foreign Office about this matter, and the comment in his letter to us is this:—

"Our Foreign Office are the utter bottom; really, the final END. They simply don't care. Unless the Americans steam up nothing will happen. . . ."

A Serious Accusation

This is a most serious accusation from a General of high rank, who has recently occupied positions of top importance.

CURIOUS POLITICAL TENDENCIES IN BRITAIN

A WORKING man correspondent of ours, who is daily at the bench, and devotes part of his spare time to writing 30 pages a month to our Editorial Office, tells us that, in his view, while the Conservative Party remains very unpopular, nevertheless, many sincere Socialists are beginning to wonder how their Party could govern, in view of the acute internal difficulties which persist.

In his opinion, this has caused more trouble amongst the rank and file of Socialist voters than many people realise.

Like many other observers, he seems to draw a distinct line between the mass of workers who vote Socialist, and the Party Caucus.

Several Categories of Socialists

It would seem pretty clear, from what he and others tell us, that the Socialists are divided into several categories.

First, there are the old-time political and Union leaders, many of whom are now virtually Conservative, partly because they have had experience of

AC 201/1)

CONFIDENTIAL

United Kingdom Delegation
Advisory Commission UNRWA
BEIRUT
c/o British Embassy,
BEIRUT.

6th November, 1952.

FO 1824/58 INDEXED

Dear Richmond,

With reference to my letter (AC 201/1) of the 28th October to Miss Waterlow drawing attention to General Galloway's effusion in the INTELLIGENCE DIGEST, I enclose a copy of the article, in case it was not easily accessible in London.

Yours sincerely,

(H.F. Knight)

J.C.B. Richmond, Esq.,
Middle East Secretariat,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

C.B.
1952
DEPT.
B/a

By Private Subscription only

14th Year, No. 167, October 1952.
24 pages

I N T E L L I G E N C E D I G E S T

A REVIEW OF WORLD AFFAIRS

AIR MAIL EDITION

Notice to our Readers

This edition of Intelligence Digest is necessarily inferior in appearance, owing to the importance of conforming with postal rates for Air Mail productions:

This Digest is published monthly. Interested persons should apply to :

NEW YORK ... ... 7024 Empire State Building,

LONDON ... ... Alderbourne Manor, Gerrards Cross, Bucks.
or 14, Old Queen Street, S.W.1.

(Page 18)

ARAB REFUGEES - ANOTHER CASE FOR INQUIRY

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As a result of the Palestine war, there are just under one million refugees in Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria and Irak.

The work of U.N.R.W.A.

In November, 1948, the General Assembly of the United Nations voted 32 million dollars for a 9 months relief programme to be controlled by the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees in cooperation with the International League of Red Cross Societies, the Swiss International Committee of the Red Cross, and the American Quakers. In due course, a new Agency, U.N.R.W.A. (United Nations Relief & Works Agency), was set up, which assumed responsibility in May, 1950.

(Page 19)

Much money has been spent, but, despite this, the great majority of these refugees are without work or homes, and 35 per cent of them still live in camps. The remainder exist as best they can. For the most part, they sit about idle, absorbing relief, and losing morale.

They are increasing at the rate of about 12,000 a year, and if U.N.R.W.A. and the governments of the Arab countries where these refugees have taken shelter are not more successful in the future than they have been in the past, the resettlement rate will do no more than keep pace with the population increase.

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Useless Conferences:

Once a month, representatives of all the countries, which have refugees attend a conference in Beirut. This lasts two days, and is considered, by those who attend it, as a pleasant change at the seaside.

The agenda is not circulated until representatives arrive, so they have not the slightest idea of what is to be discussed. The performance opens with a long-winded speech by the Director, followed by an exhaustive exhortation to unity and the achievement of some high purpose, and especially the avoidance of a colonial approach, which is supposed to be a dig at Britain. At noon, the meeting adjourns for refreshme which is thoroughly enjoyed by all - no expense being spared. The session is then resumed, and drifts to a dreary close, generally with a series of resolutions to postpone taking any decision at all.

After two useless days, representatives go home wondering what it was all about, but still without a reply as to whether or not the local milk orderly can be transferred from one camp to another.

Wasted Visits:

Between July, 1951, and March, 1952, the Director of this remarkable agency paid five visits to one country, involving a stay of one night on each occasion. He usually arrived in the evening, and left at noon on the following day.

DURING THESE VISITS HE NEVER VISITED A SINGLE REFUGEE CAMP

A trip to Paris:

Last Autumn, during the United Nations Assembly in Paris, the Director and members of the Advisory Commission went to submit a report. They took three months for this agreeable purpose. The object of the report was to acquire further large funds for refugee relief and settlement.

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An interesting compromise, resulting from this delightful three months' visit to Paris, seemed to please the Director of the Administration, but has not solved, and will not solve, the problem of these unhappy refugees.

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Urgent Need for Changes:

First of all, U.N.R.W.A. must have a new and competent Director, who understands the Arabs, and has some idea of office administration and organisation. This Agency needs a man who can decentralize, knows how to take decisions, and whom people trust.

There will be no settlement of the major problems of the Middle East until this refugee problem is settled. If it is not settled, it will become a dangerous ulcer.

The Issue Facing the Arab Governments:

There are a number of issues which the Arab governments concerned do not want to face. Somehow or other, at least three-quarters of a million refugees have got to be made self-supporting. There is not the slightest chance of these people being reabsorbed in Israel. They cannot be allowed to continue unsettled.

The Arab governments must understand that international aid for these refugees cannot for ever continue, and it may be necessary to point out the areas where they can best be settled.

If the difficulties are great, the first essential is to have the whole problem handled by men who understand the Middle East, and whom the Middle East understands; men who are at once resolute and trustworthy.

A Disquieting Report:

If anyone should think that this report be over-critical, Intelligence Digest should perhaps state that it comes from a ranking General, who has held extremely important appointments during and since the war, and who happens to be fully aware of all the facts of this case. His evidence should be heard by those ultimately responsible for this matter.

The full report which he has sent us, together with his covering letter, is very disquieting. He says that he has seen the British Foreign Office about this matter, and the comment of his letter to us is this :-

" Our Foreign Office are the utter bottom; really, the final END. They simply don't care. Unless the Americans steam up nothing will happen.....".

A Serious Accusation:

This is a most serious accusation from a General of high rank, who has recently occupied positions of top importance.

UNRWA activities to alleviate the plight of Arab refugees in the Middle East; work of voluntary organisations including churches; interest by MPs in HMG contributions to UN plan. Code EE file 1824 (papers 41 - 58). 1952. MS Refugee Records from the General Correspondence Files of the Political Departments of the Foreign Office, Record Group 371, 1947-1970 FO 371/98506. The National Archives (Kew, United Kingdom).